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Purpose:  The main purpose of this thesis is to determine to what extent, if 
any, outsiders are able to obtain abnormal returns by mimicking 
the behaviour of insiders at the Swedish stock market prior to 
earnings announcement. By making separations this study will 
hopefully provide some advice when the abnormal returns are 
most likely to happen when outsiders mimic insiders.  
 
Methodology:  This study is implemented through a quantitative approach. 
Separations between kind of insiders, Market-to-Book values of 
the companies, financial crisis vs. non-crisis and size of the 
company are made in order to increase the comparability to 
other studies. Two statistical tests are performed in order to 
determine if the results are significant. 
 
Theoretical perspectives:  This study is built upon previous research in the area of insider 
trading. The most important theory for this study is the efficient 
market hypothesis. Other important theories are information 
asymmetry and signalling hypothesis. 
 
Empirical foundation:  Insider transactions around the full year reports for companies 
listed at Nasdaq OMX Stockholm during 2007-2010 are 
studied. Companies that are listed or delisted during the period 
are included the years when there is sufficient information.   
 
Conclusion:  The result from this study suggests that it is good to follow the 
insiders with most information in order to obtain abnormal 
returns. No clear relationship between firm size, Market-to-
Book and abnormal returns is established. Following insiders 
during good or normal times is superior to follow them during a 
crisis.  
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1 Introduction 
In this first chapter an introduction to the subject is given and some of the interesting aspects 
of the subject are explained. The purpose of the thesis and the contribution to the knowledge 
base is discussed. The chapter ends with a discussion about the delimitations.   
1.1   Background 
Is there an easy, straightforward way to create abnormal returns
1
 on a stock exchange? If you 
are an investor you probably think, or at least hope so. There are numerous studies (e.g., 
Abarbanell and Bushee 1998; Seyhun 1986) regarding abnormal returns and how that can be 
obtained. Some investors use technical analysis, some fundamental analysis and other uses 
other methods. According to the efficient market hypothesis brought forward by Fama (1970) 
it should not be possible to systematically beat the market, since the information available is 
already incorporated in the current stock price. As intuitive evidence against this hypothesis 
stand Warren Buffet and his Berkshire Hathaway. He has on average had an abnormal return 
of 11% since 1965, a truly remarkable achievement (Berkshire Hathaway 2011).  
   One aspect regarding abnormal returns is insider trading and its informational content. It is 
a subject that has been debated and studied a long time. There are different conclusions 
depending on the studied market, time horizon, method and similar. Some authors argue that 
insiders can obtain abnormal returns and some suggests the opposite. The notion that insiders 
have information that outside investors have not is quite intuitive. One of the most quoted 
articles in this field is Insiders Profits, Costs of Trading, And Market Efficiency by Seyhun (1986). He 
finds that insiders are able to predict future changes in the stock price and obtain abnormal 
returns. Others, such as Eckbo and Smith (1998) find no abnormal return for insider trading.  
  
Many persons strive to become wealthy and some of them perhaps do not care too much 
about how to become it. Homo Economicus, as defined by Mintzberg (2002), is the modern 
economic man, never satisfied and always striving for personal utility maximization. This has 
led to many corporate scandals, some of them in the field of insider trading. One quite recent 
example is David Sokol, previously seen as Warren Buffet’s likely successor, who is 
currently under investigation from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for illegal 
insider trading. He bought a lot of shares in a company that he afterwards recommended 
Berkshire Hathaway to buy and he made approximately 20 million SEK from this. He left 
Berkshire Hathaway after this, but Buffett himself rejects that it has something to do with the 
insider trading (Veckans Affärer 2011). The problem with insider trading is that it can be hard 
to determine whether or not an insider transaction is illegal or not, since it is hard to make a 
clear distinction if the insider is acting on insider or public information. For that reason many 
of the persons accused of illegal insider trading have not been found guilty (E24 Näringsliv 
2010).  
   There have been some studies of the Swedish stock market (e.g., Wahlström 2003), but the 
knowledge about insider transactions and its informational content can be developed further 
and can perhaps be used to increase the returns of investments, as suggested by some authors. 
                                                
1
 Abnormal returns are returns in excess of the returns predicted by an asset pricing model, such as the market 
model that is further discussed in chapter 4.  
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1.2  Problem Discussion 
As mentioned in the previous section, insiders may be able to exploit their informational 
advantage in order to obtain abnormal returns. What about outsiders? Is there a way for 
outsiders to benefit from the informational content in insiders’ transactions? There are an 
abundant of studies (e.g., Seyhun 1998; Dickgiesser and Kaserer 2010) that look at different 
aspects of insider trading and abnormal returns. Some of them study just insiders and the 
returns they are able to achieve while others investigate outsiders’ ability to follow insiders’ 
transactions.
  
   
One aspect regarding insider trading is when it precedes earnings announcements. Ball and 
Kothari (1991) show that earnings announcements have on average a positive stock price 
effect. Korczak, Korczak and Lasfer (2010) study insider trading around earnings 
announcement in the UK. They find that insiders tend to purchase shares prior to good 
announcements and sell prior to bad, but there is a trade-off for insiders between making 
profits by buying prior to good announcements and regulations and losing reputation.   
   Another thing to consider regarding insider trades is if there is a difference between 
companies depending on the market value and the market-to-book value. Dickgiesser and 
Kaserer (2010) study this in the German stock market. They find that insider trades in so 
called value stocks tend to be followed by large price movements for buy transactions and 
small price movements for sell transactions. The opposite is true for glamour stocks. Since 
they are already highly valued, buy transactions does not affect the stock price that much. If 
they however are somewhat overvalued and insiders sell these riskier stocks, it can be a 
negative signal to market participants. 
   Lakonishok and Lee (2001) study insider trades in the US during the period 1975-1995. 
Their conclusion is that insider purchases are informative but sales are not. This is somewhat 
intuitive because insiders can sell for numerous reasons, but they buy only to make money. 
Lakonishok and Lee also say that it is quite hard to implement a trading strategy based on 
insider’s transactions. 
   Many of the previously mentioned studies are conducted in markets other than the Swedish 
stock market. Some of the more important studies were performed quite a long time ago. As 
is obvious from the background and will be even clearer after the literature chapter is that the 
studies show inconclusive results. This can be due to several reasons, which is further 
discussed in the end of the literature chapter. Among the reasons might be different markets, 
different time, different length of the study etc. Without performing a study of the Swedish 
stock market it is hard to predict what the result would be. To our recognition there is only 
one published study of the Swedish stock market, performed by Wahlström and published in 
2003. Wahlström’s study has some shortcomings that this study aims to improve in order to 
find valuable results about the Swedish market.
2
 Apart from Wahlström’s study there are 
numerous master theses about insider trading, some of them focusing on outsiders’ ability to 
mimic insiders. Previous theses have however not incorporated any transaction costs, making 
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 We are unable to get hold of the Wahlström’s study and have therefore not read it. According to Göran 
Andersson, Associate Professor at Lund School of Economics and Management, Wahlström’s study had some 
shortcomings, such as the absence of a non-parametric test. This might lead to wrong conclusions about the 
market being drawn.  
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the results less useful since many studies of other markets find abnormal returns but only 
when transaction costs are disregarded. By including both a measure of transaction costs as 
well as non-parametric test this study has potential to improve the knowledge base about 
insider trading at the Swedish stock market.  
   As discussed above, Korczak et al. (2010), find a positive correlation between insider 
transactions and the return after a news announcement. Ball and Kothari (1991) find that 
earnings announcement tend to be associated with positive returns on average. Due to this fact 
it is more likely to make abnormal returns by mimicking insiders’ behaviour prior to a news 
announcement and this study does for that reason study the time around earnings 
announcement.  
   To our recognition there are no published studies of the Swedish market where the effect of 
the recent financial crisis is incorporated. Studies in other countries have included this feature 
when it comes to insider trading. By including the recent financial crisis some conclusions 
might be drawn about personal liquidity needs and similar, that possibly can affect insiders’ 
transactions. If insiders are financially constrained there might be more insiders selling during 
the years of the financial crisis.  
   Many of the other studies mentioned above are also only considering if insiders are able to 
obtain abnormal returns but ignores to study outsiders’ ability to do the same by mimicking 
insiders. The knowledge about the Swedish market can also be improved by studying a more 
recent period and by making similar separations as studies from other markets.  
   As investors want to increase their returns by different means one possible way can be by 
mimicking insiders’ behaviour. Since the studies regarding insider trading at the Swedish 
Stock market is quite limited this study will investigate and try to improve the knowledge 
base by trying to answer the following questions: 
 
! To what extent are outside investors able to earn abnormal returns by imitating 
insiders’ purchasing behaviour prior to an earnings announcement?  
 
" Under which conditions, will the possibilities to obtain abnormal returns be the 
greatest? Separations are made between the following:  
 
# Financial crisis vs. Non-crisis 
# Market value of equity, separate between Large Cap, Mid Cap and Small Cap 
# Kind of insider, separate between CEO / Vice President, Board Members, 
Large shareholders and Others 
# Market-to-book, divided into four different groups 
1.3  Purpose of Our Thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute with additional knowledge in the field insider 
trading and its informational content. This is done by looking at how insiders are trading prior 
to an earnings announcement on the Swedish Stock exchange. The main objective is to study 
to what extent, if any, outsiders can achieve abnormal return by mimicking insiders’ 
transactions and under which circumstances the possibility for abnormal returns are the 
greatest.  
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1.4  Delimitations 
Some delimitations are made, partially due to the limited time frame and partially for other 
reasons. These reasons are further discussed in chapter 4.  
 
! The studied market is the NASDAQ OMX Stockholm Large-, Mid- and Small-cap. 
The investigated firms have been listed on the NASDAQ OMX Stockholm during the 
years 2007-2010. Companies not listed during some of the observed period are only 
excluded this period, in order to avoid survival bias.
 3
 Companies with a fiscal year 
ending on a date other than December 31 are not included the last year since their 
report for fiscal year 2010 is not yet released. This makes the result less likely to 
exhibit survival bias.  
 
! The study is limited to just focusing on net purchasing signals. Net sales are not 
regarded since they might be the result of multiple reasons while purchases are mainly 
done to make profits. Other transactions such as allocations, gifts or stocks from 
incentives programs etc. are not considered since they are not actively traded to make 
profits in the same manner as buying.  
 
! Some types of transaction costs such as commission fees and taxes are ignored, since 
they are very individual depending on the kind of investor and would have made the 
analysis of the data complicated. The only measure of transaction costs included in the 
calculations is separation of ask, bid, mid and closing quotes for the stock prices.   
1.5  Target Group 
The target group of this thesis are primarily other students in finance and investors in general 
with an interest in finding a way of beating the market and gaining abnormal returns. Other 
persons will hopefully find it interesting as well. This thesis can be read as a way to increase 
the knowledge in different fundamental economic theories in general and the theories of 
insider transactions in particular. 
 
                                                
3
 The survival bias is a systematic error due to the fact that only the companies ”surviving” the entire 
investigated period is in the end sample. By including all companies, even if they are only listed for some of the 
time period we will reduce this risk.  
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1.6  Thesis Outline 
  
2.  Laws, 
Regulations and 
Authorities 
•! In chapter two the regulatory framework for insider trading is treated. 
It starts by looking at two of the most central acts in this area, which 
defines an insider and regulates their reporting obligations. The 
authorities controlling and observing the insider trading are examined 
in the end of this chapter.  
3.  Literature 
•! This chapter begins with a discussion about the economic theories 
that are relevant for this study. It is followed by a discussion of 
previous empirical studies in this field and ends with a summary of the 
studies and their importance for this study.   
4. Methodology 
•! In this chapter the methods, such as data collection and the 
construction of this event study, will be explained. There is also a 
discussion about the validity and reliability of the results and a 
reflection of the potential sources of errors.  
5. Results and 
Analysis 
•! In this chapter the results of the study are presented in the form of 
tables with comments intended to increase the likelihood that the 
result is correctly understood. In this chapter the results are based on 
the mid quotes of the stock prices. The results of the tests based on the 
other quotes can be seen in Appendix 8.6-8.9.  
6.  Concluding 
Discussion 
•! In this chapter there is a concluding discussion about the results in 
this study. Thoughts about the reasons for the particular results are 
expressed as well. There is also a part with proposals of further 
studies in the field of insider trading.   
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2  Laws, Regulations and Authorities 
In chapter two the regulatory framework for insider trading is treated. It starts by looking at 
two of the most central acts in this area, which defines an insider and regulates their reporting 
obligations. The authorities controlling and observing the insider trading are examined in the 
end of this chapter.  
2.1  Laws & Regulations 
There are a number of laws and regulations regarding insider trading in Sweden. The laws are 
controlled by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, Finansinspektionen. As stated on 
the homepage of Finansinspektionen:  
 
 
“A person holding an insider position must report shareholdings and other financial 
instruments in the company held by him or her and closely affiliated natural and legal 
persons.”  
(Source: Finansinspektionen. Insider’s Reporting Duty) 
 
The laws relevant for this study are briefly reviewed below. Only the aspects of the laws 
relevant for this study are discussed.  
2.1.1  SFS (2005:377) Financial Instruments Trading (Market Abuse 
Penalties Act) 
The Market Abuse Penalties act is a central law that regulates most of the issues concerning 
insider trading and also some of the penalties for different kinds of insider law violations. In 
the 1§ insider information is defined as non-public information or circumstance that might 
affect the price of a security significantly. Violating this law by making transactions based on 
inside information in an illegal way, or by sharing the information with an outsider who tries 
to exploit the information may result in a penalty. The 2§ states that the penalties range from 
fines if the offence is minor to jail sentence up to four years if the offence is severe.  This law 
also controls other insider offences such as trying to affect the market price in an unlawful 
way or hiding information that actually should be public information. Both these types of 
offences can render fines or prison sentences. In the 10§ and 16§, the law declares that all 
insider trading or actions should be notified to Finansinspektionen, which has the duty to 
make certain that this law is followed. If they suspect that someone is trying to make some 
illegal inside procedure they should report it to a prosecutor at the Swedish Economic Crime 
Authority. 
2.1.2  SFS (2000:1087) The Act concerning Reporting Obligations for 
Certain Holdings of Financial Instruments 
This law from 2000 treats who has to report certain holdings and changes of financial 
instruments and under which conditions these reports have to be made. In the 3§ of the Act 
concerning Reporting Obligations for Certain Holdings of Financial Instruments the different 
characteristics of who is considered an insider is explained, for example: 
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! President & Vice President 
! Members of the Board of Directors 
! Auditors 
! Other employees in leading positions in the firm or subsidiaries.  
! Shareholders with at least 10% ownership of the total equity capital or voting rights.  
 
Insiders must notify the authority about the financial instruments of husband, minors and 
other closely related family from the same household, according to the 5§. People in insider 
positions also need to report changes in their stockholdings in companies that are connected 
to them or their firm. Finansinspektionen needs to be notified about the transaction no later 
than five working days after the agreement has been made, according to the 6§. Further, they 
are not allowed to make any transactions closer than 30 days before any ordinary report, 
which is stated in 15§. Breaching this regulation can render quite heavy fines for that insider, 
ranging from 15 000-350 000 SEK, as treated in 21§.  
2.2  Authorities 
There are two main authorities that ought to be mentioned when it comes to insider trading, 
The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (Finansinspektionen) and the Swedish 
Economic Crime Authority (Ekobrottsmyndigheten) and they will be briefly discussed below. 
2.2.1  The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (Finansinspektionen) 
The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, or Finansinspektionen, was established in 
1991 with the purpose to create an authority that governs securities, banks and insurance 
companies (Finansinspektionen. About Us). It is a public authority that supervises all 
companies in the Swedish financial markets, as of today close to 4000 different companies. 
Finansinspektionen is also responsible of analysing trends in the financial markets and 
making sure that companies follow the current regulations. They release different reports 
regarding risks in the financial markets and similar. In order to provide financial services in 
Sweden companies need the authorization of Finansinspektionen.  
   If there is a need for new laws it is also the task of Finansinspektionen to detect and propose 
amendments. They also publish all insider transactions at their homepage at the Insider 
Trading register. Another thing that Finansinspektionen are responsible for is making sure 
that companies provide investors with sufficient and accurate information. 
Finansinspektionen are also involved in some operations globally and within the EU. There 
are different co-operations in different segments that they are involved in, for example The 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.  
   What is most important in this context is that they are responsible for making sure that 
companies act in accordance with the Swedish insider regulations. The laws discussed in 
more detail above represent the framework that insiders must follow. If there are any possible 
offences against the law, Finansinspektionen is the authority that should detect and investigate 
this. If they find that there is an offence against the law, they leave it to a prosecutor at the 
Swedish Economic Crime Authority to investigate. 
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2.2.2  Swedish Economic Crime Authority (Ekobrottsmyndigheten) 
The Swedish Economic Crime Authority is responsible for several different things 
(Ekobrottsmyndigheten. About Us). They do for example fight economic crime in general. 
They currently have several different priority areas, such as fighting economic crime related 
to other organised crime, and perhaps more relevant in this context, crime that threatens the 
financial markets. Illegal insider trading is one such crime. Ekobrottsmyndigheten (EBM) 
cooperates with Finansinspektionen in case of potential insider crimes. If Finansinspektionen 
detects a potential illegal act, they contact a prosecutor at EBM. It is the task of EBM to 
determine if there is evidence of a crime, and in that case to bring it to court. EBM has the 
national responsibility of making sure that the Act (2005:377) mentioned above is followed.  
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3 Literature 
This chapter begins with a discussion about the economic theories that are relevant for this 
study. It is followed by a discussion of previous empirical studies in this field and ends with a 
summary of the studies and their importance for this study.   
3.1  Theories 
In this subsection the theories that are most relevant for the study will be discussed and 
explained into some detail. Those readers with an understanding of general economic theories 
can skip this part and begin reading section 3.2.  
3.1.1  Information Asymmetry   
A well-known subject in the financial world is the concept of information asymmetry, which 
is when different parties in an agreement or deal are not having the same kind of information. 
The definition of information asymmetry according to the Dictionary of Business (2003 p.8) 
is when one of the parties has superior information than the other party. This can possibly be 
exploited by, for example charging a higher price than the fair price of the product or service.  
   Hillier, Grinblatt and Titman (2008, ch.19) treats a number of reasons why firms do not 
have full transparency leading to some information asymmetry. It can for example be that the 
firm does not want to reveal some of its most valuable information to competitors or avoid the 
risk of lawsuit due to false information sharing in an initial stage. Most insiders are also aware 
of the signals changes in their personal stockholding send to the market and must therefore be 
a bit restrictive when conveying information to outsiders.  
   Even though earnings announcements and financial changes such as dividends and equity 
issues reveal information to outsiders and making the information asymmetry less of an issue 
studies have shown that investors underreact to news disclosure (Michaely, Thaler & 
Womack 1995). They find that the market is slow to react to announcements of dividends 
thus making it favourable to trade just after the news to make profits from the announcement 
and holding over a longer period. This indicates that an information gap between the market 
and the firm exist, which possibly can be exploited.  
 
Information asymmetry is also present in the world of insider trading where the insider have 
better information than outsiders. In a study by Frankel and Li (2004) they examine how the 
information asymmetry affects the insider trading and the ability for insiders to achieve 
abnormal profits. They argue that firms are trying to minimize the information asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders by having better information in their reports and 
announcements. Improved analyst coverage does also help when trying to reduce the 
information gap, thus making it harder for insiders to make profits on their information 
advantage. When looking at the volume of the insider traders Frankel and Li discover that all 
kinds of announcements increase the insider trading but the more information that is revealed 
the less trading exists.  
3.1.2  Efficient Market Hypothesis  
Fama (1970) developed the Efficient Market Hypothesis in its most known form. The interest 
for efficient markets was however developed earlier, but at that time under the name of 
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“random walk” and “rational expectations theory”. At first the hypothesis was only something 
a few economists believed in, but became more or less common knowledge during this time 
(Jensen 1978). According to Fama (1970) an efficient market is a market where prices fully 
reflect all available information. He distinguishes between three different types of efficiency; 
(i) Weak form, (ii) Semi-strong form and (iii) Strong form.  
3.1.2.1 Weak form efficiency  
According to the weak form efficiency all historical information are already priced into the 
security. Therefore, it should not be possible to analyse historical data and in that way obtain 
abnormal returns on a continuous basis. Most of the tests of the efficient market target the 
weak form efficiency and the evidence seems to point in the direction of an at least weak 
efficient market. Fama (1970) also find that large changes in prices tend to be followed by 
another large change, but the direction is unpredictable. If there is a divergence between the 
actual price and the fair price of a security, investors would immediately see this and the price 
would then be corrected. According to Fama this implies that it takes time to completely 
evaluate important information. Technical analysis, i.e. analysing historical prices and similar 
would under this form of efficiency not lead to any form of abnormal returns.  
3.1.2.2 Semi-strong form efficiency 
This is the form of efficiency that is relevant for this study. In the semi-strong form of 
efficiency it is assumed that prices reflect all historical information as well as currently 
available public information. Studies regarding this form of efficiency also support the 
hypothesis of the efficient market. The information in different types of announcements, e.g. 
earnings and dividend announcements, M&A announcements and similar, is on average 
already taken into consideration in the current stock price. Investors can for that reasons not 
analyse this kind of information in order to obtain abnormal returns, assuming that the semi-
strong form of efficiency holds.  
3.1.2.3 Strong form efficiency 
According to the strong form efficiency stock prices reflects all available information about a 
company. In that case there should be no way in which investors can obtain abnormal returns. 
Not even insiders with a lot of non-public information should therefore be able to achieve 
abnormal returns. If this is true, there should be no proof of excess returns for the insiders in 
Swedish companies. However, according to Fama the strong form of efficiency is best viewed 
as a benchmark used to compare the market efficiency and deviations from this. One such 
deviation is the insiders’ ability to use their informational advantage in order to obtain 
abnormal returns.  
   Fama (1991) released a sequel to this original article from 1970 where he discusses the 
development of the market efficiency theory. He study different event studies by other 
scholars and comes to the conclusion that, on average, markets react quite fast to new 
information and this is an evidence of the efficiency of the capital markets. Fama discusses 
studies by Jaffe (1974) and Seyhun (1986) that suggests that insiders can use their non-public 
information in order to make abnormal returns, which contradicts the efficient market 
hypothesis in its strongest form. Outsiders can however not use this information in order to 
achieve abnormal returns. These studies are further discussed below in section 3.2.1.   
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3.1.3  Signalling Hypothesis  
There are numerous different actions a company can take in order to signal different things 
according to Hillier et al. (2008, ch.19). Increasing dividends signal good growth prospects, 
while decreasing dividends is a signal that is badly perceived by the market. Raising more 
debt also signals good growth prospects since the company are unlikely to raise more debt if 
they are not certain that they can manage the higher debt burden and interest payments. 
Raising more equity signal that the equity is overvalued, and therefore the market often reacts 
negatively to this type of action. 
   Recent research by Del Brio and Miguel (2010) finds that the informational content in 
dividends changes is decreasing whereas the informational content in insider transactions is 
more valuable. John and Lang (1991) mean that the best way to signal different things to the 
market is probably by combining different types of signals. By increasing dividends at the 
same time as insiders are net purchasers of a stock should be seen as a good and strong signal.  
   Hillier et al. (2008, ch.19) mean that share repurchases are another action a company can 
take in order to signal to the market that the stock is undervalued. One study by Firth, Leung 
& Rui (2010) find that if a share repurchase is announced and insiders at the same time buy 
shares it is a very strong signal that the stock is undervalued. If insiders however sell their 
shares the negative information conveyed in this action outweighs the positive information 
from the share repurchase and the effect will therefore be a decreasing stock price. 
   Seyhun and Bradley (1997) investigate insider transactions prior to bankruptcy filings and 
find that insiders tend to sell their shares prior to this filing, beginning in small scale and then 
increasing in intensity as the bankruptcy filing approaches. Their findings support the idea 
that the informational content in insiders’ transactions is of importance and can be used to 
analyse upcoming events. 
   The relevant signal for this study is of course the transactions that insiders make. Different 
studies come to different conclusions regarding the signalling effect of insiders’ transactions. 
One intuitive conclusion that Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find is that the informational 
content in insiders’ purchases is useful while it is not useful for insider sales. The reasons for 
this is that insiders can sell their shares for numerous reasons, but the only reason that they 
buy shares are because they think they will make money out of it. Dickgiesser and Kaserer 
(2009) find contradicting results, namely that insider sales are informative whereas purchases 
are not. Both studies are elaborated further below. 
3.1.4  Random Walk   
The concept of random walk has been treated by economists for a long time. One early study 
was made by Kendall (1953) where he examined the movements of prices in time series. He 
finds that the movements were impossible to predict and that the fluctuations in prices during 
different close intervals were large and totally random. This random walk in prices made it 
impossible to see any systematic effects or make predictions with certainty. 
   Fama (1965) developed the random walk further in his famous article Random Walks in 
Stock Market Prices. He concludes that if the random walk hypothesis holds it is unnecessary 
for investors to use methods and models trying to predict market movements. Theorists were 
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able to find some patterns of price changes but unable to forecast them with any real 
consistency, which talks in favour of the random walk.  
   Discussions about the usefulness of the random walk have been subject to debates during 
the years and one famous disagreement started when Malkiel (1973) wrote his book A 
Random Walk Down Wall Street, where he gave support to the random walk theory after 
making a study of stock trading with the help of coin flipping. Malkiel’s book was questioned 
by Lo and MacKinley (2002) in their book with the slightly ironical title; A Non-Random 
Walk Down Wall Street. Today, the random walk is incorporated into many economic and 
statistical models such as the Merton model
4
 through the stochastic term (Gray and Malone 
2008). 
3.2  Empirical Studies  
In this section previous empirical studies conducted in the field of insider trading are 
discussed. There are numerous studies to bring up and the ones most relevant for this study 
are mentioned below. 
3.2.1  Studies  
Jaffe (1974) conducted a study regarding insider trading. He studies, among other things, the 
informational content of public disclosure of insider transactions. The report he study is The 
Official Summary of Insider Trading, which is similar to the Swedish Financial Supervisory 
Authority’s Insider Register. The first finding is that insiders can earn abnormal returns. He 
also wants to find out whether or not outsiders could mimic this behaviour and earn abnormal 
returns. He find that outsiders can mimic insiders in order to earn abnormal returns in the case 
of companies with intensive trading, even after considering transaction costs. In all other 
samples the transaction costs eliminate the profits otherwise obtained through the information 
contained in the Official Summary. 
 
In an article by Seyhun (1986) he investigates if uninformed outsiders can mimic insiders’ 
transactions in order to earn abnormal profits, which would contradict the efficient market 
hypothesis. According to Seyhun insiders may have enough information to predict the future 
stock price movement and in that way earn abnormal returns. He also finds that some insiders, 
such as directors, CEOs and similar, have more information than others, thus making them 
better able to predict the future stock price movement. Further, he finds evidence of insiders 
making transactions of larger volume when they have more valuable information. When 
outsiders try to mimic insiders by the use of public information, they cannot earn abnormal 
returns, when consideration is taken to transaction costs. This is consistent with the efficient 
market hypothesis.  
 
In subsequent article by Seyhun (1988) he examines insider trading with a little twist. First he 
gets to the same conclusion as some previous studies (e.g., Jaffe 1974; Seyhun 1986) that the 
insiders have the ability to spot and exploit mispricing in their own company. The special 
thing that differentiates this study from the previous ones is that Seyhun tries to figure out if 
                                                
4
 The Merton model is used to calculate the probability of default.  
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the correct actions by insiders buying their own stock before any upswing in price are the 
result of firm-specific improvements or just the result of an overall market upswing. This 
study finds that the aggregated insider purchases and sales in one market during one month 
are closely correlated with the return of that portfolio over a longer period of 1-60 days after 
the transactions. That means that insiders trade the stock based on what they think is the 
prospects of the firm, but probably is more affected by environmental changes. This 
phenomenon is called the Lucas-effect and might be helpful when trying to imitate insiders by 
getting a clear indication when a market change is about to occur. Seyhun argues that the only 
things insiders need to keep check on is the different cash flows and from them make 
predictions, but even so, it seems like a overwhelming task since the cash flows comes from a 
great number of sources which is hard to synchronize. Seyhun also make separations between 
large and small firms and finds that insiders in small firms tend to be more accurate when 
trading on firm-specific factors compared with larger firms that tend to look more at the 
market factors. 
 
Ball and Kothari (1991) investigates a few hypothesises about stock trading close to the day 
of earnings announcements. One thing they test is if it exist any abnormal trading returns in 
the period close to the announcement. They find that the variance and betas of the return 
increase due to the news effect, thus making abnormal returns more likely. They do not 
incorporate the concept of insider trading in their study and this open up possibilities for 
further studies around the subject of announcement returns.  
 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) study the informational content of insider transactions made in 
the US during 1975-1995. In contradiction to the findings of Dickgiesser and Kaserer (2009) 
they find that insider purchases are informative but insider sales are not. They suggests that 
the reasons for this is that insiders can have many reasons for selling a stock, but only one for 
buying and that is making money. Further results from their study are that the market is slow 
to adjust to managerial signals and that insiders are more likely to buy value stocks that have 
performed well in the past than other stocks. Insiders also tend to be net buyers of small 
stocks, an asset class that historically have generated high returns. Similar to Dickgiesser and 
Kaserer, they find that large firms are priced more efficiently than small firms and that 
insiders are more active in small firms’ stocks than in large firms’ stocks. Also in line with 
Dickgiesser and Kaserer they find that insiders selling glamour stocks are a strong signal with 
a large change in price as an effect. The general conclusion of their article is that insiders’ 
transactions tend to be more informative in small-cap stocks, whereas the informational 
content in transactions of large companies’ stocks is quite low. They conclude that it is hard 
to find an investment strategy based solely on insider trading information.  
 
Another interesting article was written by Dickgiesser and Kaserer (2009). They study the 
German stock market and find that the informational content of insiders’ transactions cannot 
be used to obtain abnormal returns, once transaction costs is considered. They suggest that 
arbitrage risk is costly and that outside investors therefore cannot make abnormal returns by 
mimicking insiders’ transactions. They also find a negative relationship between idiosyncratic 
risk and speed of price adjustment. The higher the idiosyncratic risk, the longer it will take for 
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the price to adjust to the right level. Another topic in the article is the profitability of 
mimicking insiders over time and the findings suggest that it has decreased. Other things they 
find is that insider sales are considered to be a stronger signal than insider purchases and that 
past stock performance is negatively related to post-event abnormal returns. The conclusion 
of this is that insiders tend to buy stocks that have a bad historical stock performance. 
Dickgiesser and Kaserer also study value- (low market-to-book) and glamour stocks (high 
market-to-book) and its implication for abnormal returns. In the case of value stocks, they 
found small changes for insider sales and large changes for insider purchases. The opposite is 
true for glamour stocks, i.e. small changes for purchases but large changes for sales. 
Overvalued stocks are associated with higher risk and negative signals are thus more likely to 
affect the stock price strongly negative. Dickgiesser and Kaserer find that the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR, further discussed in the next chapter) decreases as the firm size 
increases. Insiders in small firms should thus be able to exploit their informational advantage 
better.  
 
Brio and Miguel (2010) performed a study of the Spanish stock market and signalling effects 
of different types of actions taken by a company and their insiders. They look at the 
informational content in dividends changes, but also insider transactions. One quite obvious 
conclusion they come to is that insider sales are seen as bad signals. Brio and Miguel find in 
their study that the informational content of dividends changes are slightly decreasing over 
time. The market does not pay that much attention to this as compared to what it used to do. 
According to them the signalling effect of dividend changes are only effective when 
combined with another signal, e.g. insider purchases. Insider trading is more informative than 
dividend changes in many cases. The authors suggest that insiders often time their 
transactions to two months prior to an announcement, which can be related to the regulations 
discussed in 2.1.2.  
    
In an article by Jiang and Zaman (2010) they study aggregate insider trading and its ability to 
predict future aggregate market return. In their study they find strong evidence of insiders’ 
ability to predict future unexpected cash-flow news, in turn related to unexpected returns. 
Their conclusion is that insiders can predict future market movements by using their superior 
information about the future cash-flow news. These findings are similar to the ones presented 
by Seyhun (1992). He study the period 1975-1989 and find that insiders’ net purchases the 
previous twelve months can predict approximately 60% of the coming twelve months 
variation in abnormal stock returns. He also find that the aggregate transactions of insiders in 
small firms can predict the future returns of stocks in larger groups of firms.
 
 
 
In a recent study by Inci, Lu and Seyhun (2010) they look at the intraday behaviour of the 
share price in respect of the insider trading. They argue that the trading of insiders convey a 
lot of information to outside investors about the company´s prospects. According to their 
study the sales and purchases of insiders tend to be followed by a large market price reaction 
during the first day after the trade. If there is a strong pattern of insiders purchasing a specific 
share, you can expect the price of that share to increase within a short time frame. The 
opposite goes for sales even though the link is not as significant. One aspect that is closely 
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related to this study is that they find stronger relationship of market price reactions due to 
insider trading the more inside information the insider is expected to have. If, for example the 
CEO of a company sells a lot of his/her shares the market prices is expected to be very 
depressed the following day. 
 
Trading around news announcements is a central aspect in this study. One recent study at the 
United Kingdom market is made by Korczak et al. (2010), where they investigate the reasons 
and results of making insider transactions just before a news announcement. They reveal that 
when buying shares from an insider position the decision to buy is based on a trade-off 
between the predicted profits and the risk of losing reputation or some regulatory risk. When 
selling shares the only real consideration is losing reputation since it sends out an 
unfavourable signal about the company’s share. As many other studies Korczak et al. finds a 
positive correlation between buying or selling and the return after the news announcement. 
The result is strongest for the group with the most inside information, such as executives. At 
the same time they find that the corporate governance characteristics do not seems to matter 
for the insider trading preferences. Further, the more sensitive news that is going to be 
revealed the less insider trading it seems to be, which can be the result of increased reputation 
risk.  
 
The insider trading during times of financial crises and especially the recent one during 2008-
2009 is explored in a study by Abumustafa and Nusair (2011). The result they find is that the 
aggregate insider trading went up during the month when the crisis was as worst. This can be 
the effect of a low personal liquidity level of some people making them selling some of their 
shares to get the funds needed. This is what they call time-function traders, i.e. investors 
buying shares when their income exceeds their expenditures and selling when the opposite 
holds. They come to the conclusion that time-function traders do not seem to outperform the 
market at any time. 
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3.2.2  Discussion and Criticism of Theories and Empirical Studies  
Table 3.1 Summary of Empirical Studies 
 
Authors 
Research 
Area 
Studied 
Period 
Market Main Findings 
Abmustafa and 
Nusair (2011) 
Insider Trading 
and Financial 
Crisis 
2008-2009 
United States 
and Kuwait 
Higher aggregate insider trading during the crisis. 
Ball and Kothari 
(1991) 
Returns around 
news 
announcements 
1980-1988 United States 
Higher variance and betas around news 
announcements lead to increase expected return. 
Brio and Miguel 
(2010) 
Informational 
content of 
dividends, 
insider trading 
etc. 
1992-1996 Spain 
Informational content of dividends slightly decreasing 
over time. Insider trading is more informative. Insiders 
time their trading to two months prior to an 
announcement 
 
Dickgiesser and 
Kaserer (2009) 
Informational 
Content of 
Insider Trading 
2002-2007 Germany 
Negative relationship between firm size and CAR. 
Outsiders cannot mimic insiders to achieve abnormal 
returns. 
Inci, Lu and 
Seyhun (2010) 
Intraday 
behaviour of 
stock prices 
around insider 
trading 
1988-2002 United States 
Insiders’ trading conveys information about the 
prospects of the firm. Intensive insider purchases often 
followed by increased stock price.  
Jaffe (1974) 
Informational 
content of 
public 
disclosure of 
insider trading 
1962-1968 United States 
Outsiders can mimic insiders to obtain abnormal 
returns in cases with intensive trading, even after 
considering transaction costs. 
Jiang and Zaman 
(2010) 
Aggregate 
insider trading 
and market 
returns 
1975-2000 United States 
Insiders can predict future market movements by using 
their superior information about future cash flows 
Korczak, Korczak 
and Lasfer (2010) 
Investigate 
reasons and 
results of 
making insider 
transactions 
prior to news 
announcements 
1999-2002 United Kingdom 
Positive correlation between purchasing/selling and 
post-announcement return 
Lakonishok and 
Lee (2001) 
Informational 
Content of 
Insider Trading 
1975-1995 United States 
Insider purchases are informative whereas sales are 
not. Insiders more likely to buy value stocks. Insiders 
more active in small-cap stocks where their actions are 
more informative.  
Seyhun (1986) 
Investigate if 
outsiders can 
mimic insiders 
to obtain 
abnormal 
returns 
 1975-1981 United States 
 Insiders have information that can be used to predict 
future stock price movement. The more informed the 
insiders are the better ability to predict stock price 
movement. Outsiders cannot earn abnormal return by 
mimicking insiders after consideration of transaction 
costs.  
Seyhun (1988) 
Investigate if 
insiders’ actions 
are the result of 
firm-specific 
improvements 
or overall 
market upswing.  
 1975-1981  United States 
Insiders trading are more affected by environmental 
changes than firm-specific changes. Insiders in small 
firms are more accurate when trading on firm-specific 
factors.  
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In the previous section a lot of studies from different markets have been mentioned and a 
short summary of those studies can be seen in Table 3.1 above. In the following section there 
is a discussion about the previous empirical studies and their relevance to this study. Possible 
explanations for the difference in results among the different studies are brought up as well.  
   Many of the studies have come to the conclusion that insiders actually can make abnormal 
returns by the use of private information (e.g., Seyhun 1986; Jaffe 1974; Jing and Zaman 
2010). These results come from several different markets and one can therefore argue that the 
possibility for insiders to make abnormal returns is not that dependent on the market where 
the insider is active. 
   There have been studies where they also look at outsiders’ ability to obtain abnormal returns 
by using the informational content of insiders’ transactions and the results have been mixed. 
Dickgiesser and Kaserer (2009) in their study of the German stock market find that once 
transaction costs have been considered the possibility for outsiders to obtain abnormal returns 
disappear. This is also similar to the findings of Seyhun (1986) in his study of the US stock 
market. Jaffe (1978) also study the US stock market and he find that outsiders in some cases 
actually can mimic insiders’ transactions and in that way obtain abnormal returns, even when 
consideration is taken to transaction costs. Jaffe’s and Seyhun’s studies are quite old and their 
explanatory power for the current environment can therefore be discussed. It is possible that 
Jaffe’s findings are not applicable in today’s environment.  
   Korczak et al. (2010) conducted a more recent study regarding insider transactions. They 
find that the more information the insiders are likely to have, the stronger the signal their 
actions send. This is similar to what Inci et al. (2010) find in another recent article. This 
suggests that it is more likely to obtain abnormal returns by following a CEO than a large 
shareholder for example, which is related to the well-known phenomena of information 
asymmetry and signalling hypothesis. The information the CEO has is probably greater than 
the information a large shareholder has. Therefore, the signalling effect of the CEO’s actions 
is likely to be more informative than the signalling effect of the large shareholder’s actions. 
This seems like a reasonable conclusion and therefore this study make a separation between 
the kind of insiders, in order to see if the same conclusion can be made about the Swedish 
stock market.  
   Ball and Kothari (1991) studied abnormal returns in the time close to earnings 
announcement but did not incorporate insider transactions. They however find that some of 
the abnormal return in the days after an announcement may be due to the news effect of the 
announcement and not related to insider transactions per se. This cannot be detected in this 
survey but the result might be biased because of the news effect and this is important to 
remember in the analysis.  
   Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find that large firms are more correctly priced than small firms, 
which also is consistent with the findings of Dickgiesser and Kaserer (2009). This is quite 
intuitive since the informational disclosure of large firms often is larger than for small firms. 
The information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders is thus likely to be greater in 
small firms. Therefore, insiders in small firms are better suitable to spot and take advantage of 
mispricing of their stocks and the information conveyed in their actions might be useful for 
outsiders as well. They also come to the conclusion that insiders’ selling glamour stocks is a 
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strong negative signal to the market. While Lakonishok and Lee suggest that insiders 
purchasing is a stronger signal than selling, Dickgiesser and Kaserer find the opposite. The 
difference in results may be due to that they study different markets. Dickgiesser and 
Kaserer’s study is conducted during general good economic development and that can have 
an effect on their result. Because of Lakonishok and Lee’s long time horizon they cover both 
troughs and peaks and their result might therefore be somewhat more reliable.  
 
Since this study investigate time of both financial crisis and non-crisis it is important to know 
how the number of insider transactions depends on the economic climate. Abumustafa and 
Nusair (2011) study insider transactions during financial crisis and find that the intensity of 
insiders’ transactions increases, which can be due to insiders being privately financially 
constrained. Their findings are only based on two years of observations and one financial 
crisis and may therefore not be generally applicable. It is however reasonable to believe that 
insiders will be affected by a downturn in the general economic climate and that can lead to 
increased intensity in the sale transactions. This might be seen in this study since the recent 
financial crisis occurs during some of the studied period. 
    
The results from previous studies regarding insider trading is quite inconclusive. It is 
dependent on the market the study is conducted in, the time horizon and the period for the 
study. There have been some studies in the Nordic countries (e.g., Eckbo and Smith 1998; 
Wahlström 2003) but none of them particularly recently conducted. This study uses the same 
approach as some of the other studies previously mentioned to ensure comparability for the 
results. The methods are discussed in detail in chapter 4.  
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4 Methodology 
In this chapter the methods, such as data collection and the construction of this event study, 
will be explained. There is also a discussion about the validity and reliability of the results 
and a reflection of the potential sources of errors.  
4.1  The Sample  
According to Backman (2008, ch.5) the two main ways to construct a study is to use the 
traditional way were you observe the phenomena objectively or to make a qualitative study 
were you try to investigate how people experience the studied event. The character of this 
study makes the traditional path more appropriate since it is more based on objective data 
than qualitative observations. The next step is formulation of hypothesizes that shall be tested 
with a 95% confidence interval. It is more or less common practice to use a 95% confidence 
interval in statistical surveys and therefore it is used here as well (Körner and Wahlgren 2006, 
p.161).  
   In order to increase the likelihood of this study leading to an increased knowledge base 
some distinctions are made that separate this study from previous ones. As mentioned in 
chapter 3, Seyhun (1986) made a well documented study of outsider’s inability to use public 
information of insiders trading patterns to gain abnormal returns. Since this study is quite old 
and for example have not taken the recent 2008-2009 financial crisis into account it could be 
good to test if Seyhun’s arguments for the efficient market holds. A more recent study that 
looked at the level of insider trading during the last financial crisis is made by Abumustafa 
and Nusair (2011). There are good opportunities to develop their result of increased insider 
trading in times of general financial trouble and to see if investors can exploit the increased 
level of public information. 
   Korczak et al. (2010) made a study similar to this where they examine how insiders traded 
close to news announcements. It can be interesting to see if their conclusions are applicable to 
the Swedish market as well.  
   To test the hypothesizes, some separations of the data is done and those separations are 
outlined below.    
4.1.1  Separation I: Firm Size 
One important aspect to consider when making the study is to separate the firms according to 
market value. Some previous studies have tested if there is any correlation between firm size 
and insider’s ability to make abnormal returns (Cheuk, Fan & So 2006; Wong, Cheuk & Wu 
2000). Both of them come to the conclusion that insiders’ in large and middle size firms are 
not able to make abnormal profits. It is only in the small firms they have the opportunity to 
make profits above the expected level. Wong et al. (2000) explains this with their finding of 
higher level of information asymmetry in smaller firms, thus making it easier to exploit 
misvaluations through insider information. They do not see any clear indication of outsiders’ 
ability to follow insiders to gain abnormal returns but suggest them to follow insiders in 
smaller firm since the chance of success is best there.  
   By separating the firms in this analysis by size the hypothesis that firm size is a determinant 
of abnormal returns is investigated. The same separations as NASDAQ OMX Stockholm 
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make is used, Large-, Mid- and Small Cap. A further description of the market value 
separation is to be seen in section 4.2.2.   
4.1.2  Separation II: Kind of Insider  
As mentioned in section 2.1.2 the definitions of who is considered an insider is quite broad. It 
is everything from executives and board members to large shareholders. Depending on the 
position of the insider, they have different ability to spot the important information and 
exploit it. Seyhun (1986) discovered this result by separating between different types of 
insiders. He find that the people with the most insight in the firm, such as chairmen and 
boards members have much better ability to predict changes in share value.  
   In order to make the study’s result comparable to Seyhun’s, a similar distinction of type of 
insider is made. This distinction is also made my Finansinspektionen, making it easier to 
study. By looking at them separately comparison to Seyhun’s (1986) study is possible.  
   The following breakdowns are made, were the first group is considered having the most 
inside information: 
 
! CEO and Vice President 
! Board Members 
! Large Shareholders 
! Others, such as auditors, family to insiders or other employees. 
4.1.3  Separation III: Market-to-Book Value  
Some previous studies have made a distinction between the Market-to-Book values of the 
companies, in order to determine when insider transactions are most informative (e.g., 
Dickgiesser and Kaserer 2009; Lakonishok and Lee 2001). A similar distinction is made in 
this study of the Swedish stock market. The whole sample is divided into quartiles and 
calculations for the different subcategories are made, in order to determine the explanatory 
effect Market-to-Book ratios have for insider transactions informational content. The 
subcategories will be as followed:  
 
1) Lower quartile:   0-25% 
2) Lower mid quartile: 26-50% 
3) Upper mid quartile: 51-75% 
4) Upper quartile:   76-100% 
4.1.4  Separation IV: Financial Crisis  
A few studies have made connections between insider trading and financial crises. 
Abumustafa and Nusair (2011) show that the aggregate insider trading of both sales and 
purchases goes up during times of financial trouble. This study is just looking at net purchases 
and because of that it is uncertain if the same pattern is seen. Abumustafa and Nusair suggest 
that the aggregate increase is the result of much more sales to support liquidity needs of 
individuals. They do not test if there are any differences for outsiders following insiders 
during good or bad financial times.   
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   Seyhun (1988) do not find any indication if it is better to follow insiders during bad or good 
financial market conditions even though he propose that you can look at insiders’ behaviour 
to spot overall market changes. This is an interesting result that demonstrates that it might be 
good to differentiate between insider signals in good and bad times.  
   Since it is hard to clearly specify with daily accuracy, when the last financial crisis started 
and ended, changes in World GDP level are used to get an estimate of that period. One can 
argue that the Swedish GDP level should be used instead but the World GDP should be a 
better proxy for the time of the financial crisis than the Swedish GDP alone. A lot of the 
companies included in the study are heavily affected by other countries as well, making 
World GDP more appropriate to use. As can be seen in Fig. 4.1 there has been high volatility 
during the last years. We consider the reports for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 to be part of the 
financial crisis while the reports for fiscal years 2007 and 2010 are considered to have taken 
place during non-crisis times.   
 
Fig. 4.1 World GDP 
 
 
 
(Source: Datastream) 
 
4.2  Description of Sample and Other Aspects 
In this section the different sampling methods and ways of constructing the analysis are 
outlined and explained.   
4.2.1  Reports 
As previously mentioned many older studies (e.g., Seyhun 1986; Dickgiesser and Kaserer 
2009) about insider trading have not included the variable of news announcement and instead 
just looked at the ability to earn abnormal returns regardless of the time. Ball and Kothari 
(1991) find that the returns are more volatile around news announcements, making it more 
likely for abnormal returns. Since the different news announcements contain a lot of 
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information that will affect the market, insiders are probably more careful when making 
purchases just prior to an announcement. The full year report conveys a lot of information, 
both about the past and managements thoughts about the future. Because of this, one can 
argue that it is more likely that the information insiders have are more valuable close to an 
announcement. Therefore, it may be better for outsiders to mimic insiders at this time, which 
is investigated in this study.  
4.2.2  Market and Choice of Companies  
Stockholm Securities Exchange was founded in 1863 and is today a part of the world’s largest 
exchange company, NASDAQ OMX. This study investigate insider trading at NASDAQ 
OMX Stockholm, which is divided into three main segments. The market value of equity 
determines the list the companies belong to. They are divided as follows: 
 
! Large Cap:  
" Market value of equity above !1Bn 
" Currently 78 companies 
 
! Mid Cap:  
" Market value of equity between !150M and !1Bn 
" As of today 82 companies   
 
! Small Cap:  
" Market value of equity below !150 M 
" Currently 123 companies 
 
The different segments are revised two times every year, first of January and first of July, 
based on a weighted average of the stock prices for November and May (Swedbank 2011).  
   All companies listed on the exchange are included in this study. A company may have been 
listed only part of the period for a couple of reasons. For example, they have made an IPO, 
have been delisted or changed list during the period. All companies that are included all or 
parts of the period are considered in this survey to avoid survival bias.  
   The information about the release dates are collected from the homepage of Dagens 
Industri. Some companies have fiscal years ending on dates other than 31 December. Because 
of that, some of the reports for fiscal year 2010 are missing. Further, there need to be 
information about insider transactions available from The Swedish Financial Supervisory 
Authority’s Insider Register.  
   Since the population is quite small it is appropriate to study the entire population, instead of 
doing a sample survey. Separation between type of companies, market value of equity, type of 
insiders etc. is also made and therefore a case study of the full population is preferable 
(Dahmström 2005, pp. 63-64).  
4.2.3  Transaction Costs 
In order to account for the transaction cost caused by the bid-ask spread this survey look at 
different quotes for the stock prices, which is common for these kinds of event studies 
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(Dickgiesser and Kaserer 2009). Consideration to bid, ask, mid and closing quotes is taken. 
The bid-ask spread is used as a transaction cost already by Demsetz (1968) in his study of the 
New York Stock Exchange. The intuition behind this is that sellers need to be compensated 
for providing the buyers with immediacy on the stock market, i.e. the spread between ask and 
bid price. According to Demsetz approximately 40% of the transaction costs are comprised of 
the ask-bid spread and 60% of commission fees. He also find that transaction costs is lower 
when the number of shareholders are higher, which would mean that the ask-bid spread ought 
to be lower for larger firms than smaller firms. The negative relationship between ask-bid 
spreads and firm size is also confirmed by Roll (1984).  
   The problem with bid-ask spreads is also discussed in an article by Lease, Masulis & Page 
(1991). They find that the result of event studies can be partially biased because of prices 
moving towards bid or ask prices. Lease et al. suggest that the midpoint of the bid and ask 
prices should be used in order to reduce the risk of a bias in the event study result. The risk of 
a bias is probably bigger for shares of smaller firms due to their larger spread. In this study 
both bid, ask, mid and latest paid is considered in order to determine the impacts the share 
price used has for the result. In the results and analysis chapter the result for the mid quotes is 
discussed the most, but consideration to the other quotes is taken as well.  
   Another transaction cost is the commission fees that investors must pay in order to make 
transactions. This fee depends on what type of investor you are and is therefore not 
incorporated in this study. Instead a table with different commission fees for different 
brokerage firms is constructed and should be used in conjunction with the returns we find in 
our study in order to determine if the returns are abnormal after consideration of these costs 
(Table 4.1). As can be seen below there is quite a divergence between different brokerage 
firms. It should also be mentioned that the commission fees paid by institutional investors is 
lower than for ordinary investors.  
 
Table 4.1 Commission Fees 
 
Brokerage Firm Commission Fee Minimum Commission
Aktieinvest 0,08-0,15% 29-99 SEK
Avanza Bank 0-0,15% 9-99 SEK
Danske Bank 0,10% 79 SEK
Handelsbanken 0,09-0,20% 99 SEK
Länsförsäkringar 0,09% 99 SEK
Mangold 0,04-0,08% 49-99 SEK
Nordea 0,00% 99 SEK
Nordnet 0,03-0,15% 39-99 SEK
Nordnet Direkt 0,15% 9 SEK
SAXO E*Bank 0,04-0,09% 59-99 SEK
SEB 0-0,09% 69 SEK
Skandia 0,03-0,10% 69-99 SEK
Swedbank 0,03-0,09% 59-99 SEK
Average 0,05-0,11% 59-88 SEK 
 
(Source: Privata Affärer) 
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4.2.4  Purchases  
As previously mentioned, all insider transactions or changes in stock holding should be 
reported to Finansinspektionen. This study only examines the net purchases of shares since 
they are more informative according to some empirical studies (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee 
2001).  One explanation is that purchases together with sales are more active choices than for 
example allocations from incentive programs. The reason why sales are excluded is that they 
might happen for a number of reasons such as avoiding losses, making profits or raising 
liquidity. Then, only purchases remain because they have probably only one real reason- i.e. 
making good returns.      
4.2.5  Time frame  
The time frame chosen is 2007-2010 to make the survey focus on the latest available data. 
Including the recent financial crisis might also bring something new to the knowledge base. 
The years chosen incorporate some time of really deep financial crisis that can be used when 
comparing with times of better financial condition. A longer time horizon has both benefits 
and disadvantages. It would probably make the results more applicable to reality due to more 
observations but because of the limited time frame available for the analysis it is not possible.   
4.3  Data Collection 
To implement this quantitative study in a good manner a lot of data collection is required. The 
numeric information such as stock quotes and insider information are mainly collected from 
Finansinspektionen and Thomson Reuters Datastream.   
4.3.1  Finansinspektionen (FI) 
The data about insider trading is gathered from Finansinspektionen. They have public 
information regarding all kinds of insider trading. The procedure starts with searching for a 
certain company during the testing period to see if any purchases have been made by insiders. 
Then the cumulative number of shares is gathered and separated between the different insider 
positions. Since it is not required to inform Finansinspektionen about the actual value of the 
transaction they do not have that information. Therefore, only the number of shares 
purchased/sold during the period is considered instead of the value of the shares.  
   The data collected from Finansinspektionen, which is a governmental authority is 
considered very reliable since the public information from them are closely regulated by 
national laws, which can be seen in Chapter 2.  
4.3.2  Datastream 
From Datastream, which is a financial database, the information of the different historical 
quotes is collected. Other data that is gathered from Datastream are Market-to-Book values, 
indices and GDP levels. The information from Datastream is highly reliable but to make 
certain that it is correct we did some random crosschecking between Datastream and the share 
price information from NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. The only potential sources of error from 
this part of the analysis are false calculations after downloading the data to Excel.  
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4.3.3 Literature 
When looking at previous empirical studies and analyses in the area of insider trading articles 
from the Lund University Library database, LibHub, are used. To further increase the 
reliability of the articles used we have chosen to use only articles from journals and publishers 
with a good reputation that requires high quality.    
   The books used are student literature from different economic, law and statistical educations 
at Lund University. Therefore, it should be reasonable to conclude that they have been 
examined thoroughly and determined to have good academic information. 
   In those cases Internet sources are used only information from adequate and trustworthy 
sources are used.   
4.4 Event Study 
In this study an event study is adopted in order to measure if and in that case, to what extent 
outsiders are able to mimic insiders’ behaviour in order to obtain abnormal returns. The aim 
of an event study is to determine if a specific event lead to abnormal returns (positive or 
negative) for a company’s stock (Benninga 2008 ch.15). The event of interest can be of 
different characters, for example an M&A announcement and earnings reports etc. In this 
particular study there will be more than one event of interest. In this subsection the outline of 
the event study is discussed. MacKinlay (1997) proposes a seven-step approach to the outline 
of an event study. 
4.4.1 Outline of the Event Study 
1. Event Definition: The most important thing when conducting an event study is to 
determine the event itself. In this study there are actually two events of interest. The 
purpose of this thesis is to determine if outsiders can mimic insiders to obtain 
abnormal returns. The first event of interest is thus the period when insiders transact. 
The second event of interest is the period after the announcement of the full year 
report. In Fig. 4.2 below the event is defined as the last day insiders’ transactions prior 
to an announcement is released. As mentioned in chapter 2 about law and regulations 
they cannot transact within the 30 days prior to an announcement and they must notify 
Finansinspektionen within five days after a made transaction. The event day is thus 25 
days prior to the announcement and is denoted !1. The cumulative abnormal return is 
calculated for different lengths of the event window, where !2 is the end of the event  
 
2. Selection Criteria: The selection criteria are of high importance as well. As previously 
mentioned, this study investigates all companies listed on Nasdaq OMX Large, Mid 
and Small Cap during the period 2007-2010. In order to minimize the risk of survival 
bias all companies are included, even if they only were listed on the specific exchange 
for a limited time. Another criterion is that there are insider transactions made during 
the period prior to the release of the report. If no transactions are made, the company 
is excluded. Since all stock prices are collected from the database of Datastream the 
information must also be available from their database. Companies that are missing in 
Datastream can for that reason not be included in this study. In section 4.1 above there 
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are further information about the different breakdowns for the companies included in 
this study. In section 1.4 there is also detailed information about the delimitations for 
the study.  
 
3.  Normal and Abnormal Returns: As MacKinlay (1997) mentions, there are mainly two 
different models used to measure normal returns; the constant-mean return model and 
the market model, which is a type of factor model. According to MacKinlay there are 
small gains from adopting a multi-factor model and he proposes that the market model 
should be used. In the market model the normal return of a stock price is a function of 
the return of an index. The market model is further discussed below in section 4.5.1. 
The abnormal return is simply the actual return less the abnormal return as predicted 
by the market model.  
 
4.  Estimation Procedure: In order to estimate the parameters in the market model an 
OLS regression is conducted against the market index of interest. In this study the 
estimation window consists of the 120 days prior to the first day of insider 
transactions. According to MacKinlay (1997), 120 trading days with daily returns is 
sufficient to get an accurate estimation of the expected returns.  
 
5.  Testing Procedure: With the normal returns in hand the abnormal returns can easily be 
calculated. In order to determine if the result is significant or not two different types of 
statistical test is conducted, Student’s t-test and Wilcoxon’s Signed Rank Test, both 
further discussed below in section 4.6.  
 
6.  Empirical Results: In the next chapter the empirical results are presented. In some 
cases the result of an event study can be greatly influenced by one or a few firms. 
Since the number of firms is large in this study that ought not to be a problem.  
 
7.  Interpretation and Conclusions: One very important aspect of the event study is to 
interpret and discuss the result. There can be many reasons for the particular result. In 
chapter six the authors’ thoughts about the result and potential reasons for the result 
deviating from previous studies are discussed.  
 
Fig. 4.2 Simplified Outline of Event Study 
Source: Own 
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4.5  Formulas and Calculations  
Most of the calculations are made with the help of Excel. In order to handle the large amount 
of data for this study as much as possible have been automated. For an excellent introduction 
to the advanced formulas in Excel, see Benninga (2008).  
4.5.1  Market Model 
The market model is the most commonly used model to determine a stock price normal 
behaviour (Benninga 2008). In this study the estimation window that is used to determine the 
normal behaviour is 120 trading days. The market model is a simple regression of a stock’s 
return and a market index return. Since this study investigates different lists of the Swedish 
stock market different indices is used, see the different indices below in Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.2 Indices Used in the Market Model 
 
List Index Used Comments
Large Cap OMX Stockholm 30 30 largest companies on Large Cap
Mid Cap OMX Stockholm Mid Cap All companies on Mid Cap
Small Cap OMX Stockholm Small Cap All companies on Small Cap  
 
Source: Own 
 
The advantage of the market model depends on the explanatory power of the regression 
analysis, as measured by R
2
. The higher the R
2
 the more of the stock’s return can be explained 
by the market model and thus the behaviour of the market index used in the regression 
analysis (MacKinlay 1997).  
   MacKinlay also say that multifactor models, e.g. Fama-French three-factor model, can be 
used to determine the normal behaviour of the stock, but that the gains from adopting a 
multifactor model are limited due to low marginal R
2
 of including more factors. In this study 
a multifactor model is not useful due to the companies being in different industries.  
   Brown and Warner (1985) find that the results of event studies with large samples are not 
particularly sensitive to the type of model used to determine the normal behaviour of the 
stock. One thing that could affect the result, at least to some extent, is that a constant Beta and 
Alpha is used during the event window. The effect of this should not be large and will 
probably not affect the result too much. The market model is thus considered to be a good 
proxy of the normal behaviour of the stock price.   
   After conducting the regression analysis the following formula below is used to determine 
the expected behaviour of the stock price. The expected return is now a function of the return 
of the index used in the regression analysis.  
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Equation 4.1 Expected Stock Price Behaviour According to the Market Model 
 
! !!" ! !! ! !!!!" ! !!" 
 
! !!" ! !"#$%&$'!!"#$%!!"#$%!
!! ! !!! ! !"#$$%&%#'()!!"#$!!!!! "#!!"#!"$$%&'!
!"# !!" ! !!!
!  
Source: MacKinlay (1997) 
4.5.2  Actual Return 
When calculating the actual return the natural logarithmic have been used. Strong (1992) 
suggests that the natural logarithmic is preferable because, among other things, it is more 
likely to be normally distributed and thus fulfilling the requirements of Student’s t-test. The 
formula for the actual returns can be seen below.  
 
Equation 4.2 Actual Returns 
!!" ! !"
!"#$%!!"!!"#$!!
!"#$%!!"!!"#$!! ! !
 
Source: Strong (1992) 
4.5.3  Abnormal Return 
In the previous section the calculation of the actual and expected return of the stock price is 
described. The abnormal return is calculated according to the following formula:  
 
Equation 4.3 Abnormal Returns 
!!!" ! !!" ! !! !!"  
Source: Benninga (2008) 
 
The abnormal return calculated from the formula above is a measure of the impact the event 
has on the behaviour of the stock price.  
4.5.4  Cumulative Abnormal Return 
The cumulative abnormal return is the sum of the abnormal returns during the event window. 
In this study there are five different lengths of the event windows and the cumulative 
abnormal return is calculated for all the different event windows. The cumulative abnormal 
return is calculated as follows:  
 
Equation 4.4 Cumulative Abnormal Return 
!"# !!! !! ! !"!
!!
!!!!
 
Source: MacKinlay (1997) 
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4.5.4.2 Variance of CAR 
The variance of CAR is needed to perform the t-test. Benninga (2008) suggests that the 
standard error of the regression prediction should be used to measure the significance of the 
result. This can be used to determine significance of the abnormal return, but needs to be 
adjusted in order to be useful for the cumulative abnormal return. MacKinlay suggests that the 
following formula should be used:  
 
Equation 4.5 Variance of CAR 
 
!"# !"# !!! !! ! !!
!
! !!!!! ! ! !!!
!  
 
!!!
! !"#$%#&%!!""#"!!"!!"#!"$$%&' 
Source: MacKinlay (1997) 
4.5.5  Cumulative Average Abnormal Return 
When the CAR is calculated for all observations in the sample the Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Return (CAAR) is calculated. The statistical test, further discussed below in 
section 4.6 is conducted with respect to the CAAR. The CAAR is calculated according to the 
following formula:  
 
Equation 4.6 Cumulative Average Abnormal Return 
!""# !!! !! ! !!"!
!!
!!!!
 
Source: MacKinlay (1997) 
4.5.5.2 Variance of CAAR 
In order to conduct the t-test, the variance of the CAAR is needed. In this study the 
framework of Benninga (2008) and MacKinlay (1997) is adopted. MacKinlay (1997) suggests 
that the following proxy for the variance should be used:  
 
Equation 4.7 Variance of CAAR 
 
!"# !""# !!! !! !
!
!!
!!
!
!!! !!
!
!!!
! 
Source: MacKinlay (1997) 
4.6  Statistical Analysis 
To find out if the results from the event study are statistically assured some statistical tests are 
used and the formulation of the hypothesis as well as the statistical tests used, are treated 
below. The first step when conducting a statistical test is to formulate the hypothesis about the 
studied population. The second step is to determine the significance level and this study use 
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the commonly used 5% level as the critical area. The main reason for using statistical analysis 
is that the full population is not studied. There is always some random error when not 
including all observations in the studied area (Körner and Wahlgren 2006, ch.8). Since it is a 
relatively large number of firms that are excluded from this study, due to no insider 
transactions taking place, statistical analysis is justified to ensure the results. 
4.6.1  Hypothesises  
The aim of this study is to determine to what extent outsiders can mimic insiders in order to 
obtain abnormal returns. Some breakdowns have been made in order to determine if there is 
any difference depending on the type of insider making the transaction, the market value of 
the company etc. Similar breakdowns have been made in previous studies (e.g., Dickgiesser 
and Kaserer 2009).  
   The null hypothesis (H0) is always that no difference between the samples can be seen. In 
this study that means that no abnormal returns can be detected. The alternative hypothesis 
(H1) can be somewhat different depending on the aim of the study. In this case the alternative 
hypothesis is that abnormal returns are possible. Below the hypothesis in this study are 
treated.  
 
H0: Outsiders cannot obtain cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) by mimicking 
insiders’ transactions prior to earnings announcements.  
 
H1: Outsiders can obtain cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) by mimicking insiders’ 
transactions prior to earnings announcement.  
 
The hypotheses above are tested for the different breakdowns of the sample below. For a 
more thorough description about the breakdowns, see section 4.1.  
 
! Firm size 
" Large Cap 
" Mid Cap 
" Small Cap 
 
! Kind of insider 
" CEO / Vice President 
" Board Member 
" Large Shareholder 
" Other 
 
! Market-to-Book Value 
1) Lower Quartile (0-25%) 
2) Lower Mid Quartile (26-50%) 
3) Upper Mid Quartile (51-75%) 
4) Upper Quartile (76-100%) 
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! Financial Crisis 
" Reports released for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 are considered to have taken 
place during the financial crisis. 
" Reports released for fiscal years 2007 and 2010 are considered to have taken 
place during non-crisis times.  
4.6.2  Significance tests 
There are a number of statistical test to choose from depending on the underlying factors, 
such as number of observations and assumptions about normal distribution. The statistical 
tests used in this survey are Student´s t-test and Wilcoxon signed rank test. The reason for 
using two different tests is that there is some uncertainty about the normal distribution of the 
different samples. There are two important concepts regarding normal distribution curves that 
should be mentioned, skewness and kurtosis. The skewness measures how symmetric a curve 
is. A skewness of zero means that the curve is symmetrical around its mean, as in the case of 
the normal distribution. The kurtosis of a curve determines if the curve is flat, peaked or 
somewhere between. A normal distribution curve should have a kurtosis of approximately 
three (Salvatore & Reagle 2002). To describe the normal distribution in a way that is easier to 
understand; the standardized normal distribution has a mean of zero and a standard deviation 
of one. Populations that are not normally distributed might have some skewness or other 
defect that makes the distribution asymmetric (Körner and Wahlgren 2006, ch.5). 
   In order to detect if the assumptions behind the t-test hold Shapiro-Wilk’s normality test is 
done. This test is further discussed in section 4.6.2.3. If the studied population is not normally 
distributed or the sample is small, the usage of non-parametric methods is preferable. In cases 
when the assumptions for the parametric tests hold the efficiency of those are superior to the 
efficiency of the non-parametric tests (Körner and Wahlgren 2006, ch.12). Corrado and 
Zivney (1992) studies and compares the performance of sign test, t-test and rank test in event 
studies of abnormal security returns performance. Among their results they find that the rank 
test performs better than the sign test when it comes to usage of non-parametric test. 
Therefore, by using both the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test and the parametric 
Student´s t-test, the adequacy of the statistical testing is better and the reliability of the results 
are improved compared with only using one method. In order to determine when each method 
is appropriate normality test is conducted, which is discussed below in section 4.6.2.3.  
4.6.2.1 Student´s t-test 
Student´s t-test is a parametric test that requires that the observations follow a normal 
distribution (Körner and Wahlgren 2006, ch.7). A description of the different parts of the 
equation below is treated above in section 4.5.  
 
Equation 4.8 Student’s t-test 
! !
!""# !!! !!
!"# !""# !!! !!
 
  Source: MacKinlay (1997) 
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The most important underlying assumption behind the t-test is that the population is normally 
distributed. If it is not normally distributed the result of the t-test is not reliable and in that 
case is Wilcoxon’s signed rank test used instead.  
4.6.2.2 Wilcoxon signed rank test 
As mentioned above, non-parametric tests are used when some of the assumptions behind the 
previous test are not met. The Wilcoxon signed rank test do not do not necessarily assume a 
normal distribution of the population, but instead requires that the samples can be ranked 
(Körner and Wahlgren 2006, ch.12). One main advantage with Wilcoxon’s signed rank test is 
that the test itself eliminates the effect outliers
5
 have for the end result. 
   The idea behind the Wilcoxon signed rank test is to compare two independent samples and 
examine if the difference between them are significant. The procedure in this study is to rank 
the abnormal returns by size and give them numbers ranging from 1 to n, where 1 is given to 
the lowest and n to the highest value. This sample is compared with 0 to find if the abnormal 
returns are significant. The calculations for the Wilcoxon’s signed rank test are conducted in 
SPSS. For large samples the formula below can be used to test the hypothesis:  
 
Equation 4.9 Wilcoxon’s Signed Rank Test 
!! !
!
! ! ! !
!
! ! ! ! !! ! !
!"
 
Source: Körner (2000) p. 38 
  
4.6.2.3 Normality test 
A normality test is conducted in order to determine if the studied population can be 
considered to be normally distributed. There are a couple of commonly used normality test, 
e.g. Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Shapiro-Wilk and Anderson-Darling. The most used normality 
test is probably Shapiro-Wilk and this test is therefore used in this study (Gel Miao & 
Gastwirth 2007). The normality is conducted in the statistical software programme SPSS.  
   If the result of the normality test suggests that the population is normally distributed the 
result of interest is the one from Student’s t-test, whereas Wilcoxon’s signed rank test is more 
appropriate in the case of a non-normal distribution.  
4.7  Validity and Reliability 
In studies of this kind you want to minimize the potential sources of error, thus increasing the 
validity and reliability. High validity means that the parameters that you are studying are 
measuring what you have intent to study and describes the event in a relevant way. Reliability 
concerns the degree to which you can rely on the results and to get high reliability you want 
to avoid systematically and random errors as much as possible (Dahmström 2005, ch.10).  
                                                
5
 Outliers are observations that are far away from the mean of the sample. They can have a great impact of the 
end result if they are not approximately of the same size for negative and positive abnormal returns.  
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   There are a few potential sources of error in this study. The one of most concern for the 
reliability is the input of data from Finansinspektionen, since it is manually done. The 
constructed formulas in the excel-sheets are controlled many times but there could of course 
still be errors. The information collected from Finansinspektionen is per se very reliable since 
it is a governmental authority.  
   All information about report dates is also manually typed into Excel and this is another 
potential source of error. The dates are controlled several times in order to minimize the risk 
of a mis-representing result due to this.        
   In event studies the event windows should not be overlapping to get the best result and 
avoid clustering. In this study there can be some overlap since many of the companies have 
releases of the reports about the same time. The calculation of the variance assumes that there 
is not any overlap between the event windows across securities and can therefore be 
calculated without consideration of any covariance (MacKinlay 1997). MacKinlay (1997) 
proposes two different ways to account for the problem with clustering. Due to the limited 
time frame this consideration was not possible in this study and is thus a potential source of 
error. Due to the large sample sizes the possible error due to overlapping event windows 
should not be particularly large. 
   One important aspect to consider in an event study is the survival bias. To minimize the risk 
of a survival bias all companies that have been listed anytime during the studied period have 
been included, even if they are delisted at present or where recently listed. This makes the 
result more reliable and the analyses of the results more reliable as well.   
   Information about previous stock prices is collected from Datastream, a very reliable 
source. The potential sources of error are thus negligible. The article database of LibHub is 
used to find articles related to this study. In LibHub there are only well-renowned journals 
available and this source is therefore also considered to be very reliable.  
   One main thing that this study is built upon is the assumption that the market model gives a 
good estimation of the normal return of the stock. As can be seen in Appendix 8.5 the 
explanatory power of the market model is quite different for the different firm sizes. The 
model performs very well for Large Cap firms and Mid Cap firms, but for Small Cap firms 
the model is not as good. The lowest explanatory power for all firm sizes is during 2009 when 
the financial crisis is likely to affect this. Due to the turbulence on the stock market during 
this time the market model has a lower explanatory power than during the other years. Since 
the standard deviation is incorporated in the study when performing the statistical test one can 
argue that the lower explanatory power is considered as well since this is associated with 
higher standard deviation of the observations.     
   The overall reliability and validity of this study is considered to be good. Only reliable 
sources are used and all imputation is controlled several times in order to minimize the risk of 
typing errors. When making the event study the formulas from Benninga (2008) are used in 
order to simplify the construction as well as increasing the reliability. The main potential 
sources of error are still typing errors and to some extent the risk of clustering brought 
forward by MacKinlay (1997).  
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5 Results and Analysis 
In this chapter the results of the study are presented in the form of tables with comments 
intended to increase the likelihood that the result is correctly understood. In this chapter the 
results are based on the mid quotes of the stock prices. The results of the tests based on the 
other quotes can be seen in Appendix 8.6-8.9.  
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In this subsection is some background information presented in order to increase the 
knowledge about the different samples. A more detailed presentation of the descriptive 
statistics can be seen in Appendix 8.3-8.4.  
5.1.1 Number of Companies Included in the Study 
 
Fig. 5.1 Number of Companies Included / Excluded from the Study 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen in Fig. 5.1 above, there are a total of 275 companies included in the study. A 
part from the companies excluded by our delimitations some of the companies are excluded 
for other reasons. Appendix 8.2 shows the companies excluded with a short comment about 
the reasons for the exclusion. The companies that are missing are unlikely to affect the end 
result since they represent only a fraction of the total population.  
   Some of the companies included in the study have only been listed part of the time. The 
potential survival bias described earlier is minimized by including companies that have been 
delisted as well. The largest part of the companies is from the Small Cap list and the smallest 
part from the Large Cap list. Since the study covers four years there are roughly four times as 
many reports as companies. Appendix 8.1 presents all companies included at least one year in 
our study.  
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5.1.1 Number of Transactions 
 
Fig. 5.2 Total Number of Transactions 
 
 
As can be seen in Fig 5.2 above, the category with most transactions is the one with Small 
Cap companies. Board members are the most active among all insiders, which can be due to 
them being a quite large group at some companies. They are also the insiders with the most 
information after CEO / Vice President. Since there are only two persons in the last category 
it is an intuitive result that board members are more active. The number of insider transactions 
seems to be negatively correlated to the size of the firm.  
5.1.2 Number of Signals 
 
Fig. 5.3 Number of Signals- Divided by Type of Insider 
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In Fig 5.3 the total number of signals for the different insider categories during the studied 
period is shown. The number of signals is substantially higher for the companies included in 
the Small Cap list, both when it comes to buy and sell signals.  The sell signals for Mid Cap is 
approximately the same as for Small Cap. Least signals are seen at Large Cap, which of 
course is related to the number of firms being the fewest on this list.  
 
Fig. 5.4 Number of Signals- Divided by Year 
 
 
The number of buy signals in this study is considerably more for the first two years included. 
There is a large leap between 2008 and 2009, which might be related to the financial crisis 
that began during the autumn of 2008. The number of sell signals is approximately the same 
for all years included in the study. 
5.1.3 Market-to-Book Value 
 
Fig. 5.5 Market-to-Book Value- Divided by Year and List 
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In Fig 5.5 above are different Market-to-Book categories described. To make the analysis in 
the next section easier and clearer each category is also divided by years. Only those 
companies included in the analysis are presented in the figure above and they can be included 
more than one year. As can be seen, Small Cap companies are over-represented especially in 
Quartile 1, the one with lowest Market-to-Book values, for the first year. Mid Cap companies 
are underrepresented in Quartile 1 for 2009 and Large Cap companies for 2010. In the other 
categories/years is the result quite mixed and no clear pattern can be seen.  
5.2 Results and Analysis  
In this section are the results presented along with analysis about the results. It is important to 
remember that the only transaction cost considered is the Bid-Ask spread described earlier in 
section 4.2.3. The reason for this is that this is the only transaction cost shared by all 
investors. The reader should compare the returns to the different commission fees presented 
in section 4.2.3 to make the result more reliable.  
5.2.1 Firm Size 
In this subsection the results from the tests conducted is presented based on the size of the 
firm, and there are three different sizes; Large Cap, Mid Cap and Small Cap. In this section 
no consideration is taken to the type of insider or what year the transactions are made, the 
only breakdown is of the firm size.  
5.2.1.1 Large Cap 
 
Table 5.1 Cumulative Average Abnormal Return- Large Cap 
 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,006 7,78E-05 0,631 0,264 0,866 0,193 0,006
1 Day After Report 0,012 8,56E-05 1,331 0,092 1,630 0,501 0,024
3 Days After Report 0,015 9,34E-05 1,569 0,058 1,757 0,039 0,007
5 Days After Report 0,015 1,01E-04 1,453 0,073 1,533 0,063 0,036
10 Days After Report 0,004 1,21E-04 0,406 0,342 1,004 0,152 0,000
Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
 
As can be seen in the column to the right the normality tests shows that the distribution of the 
sample cannot be assumed to be normal and therefore Wilcoxon’s test should be used instead 
of Student’s t-test. The chosen significance level is 5% and the p-value of Wilcoxon’s test is 
above 5% for all lengths of the event window, except the event window ending on three days 
after the report. This suggests that outsiders cannot mimic insiders in Large Cap firms in 
order to systematically obtain abnormal returns.  
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5.2.1.2 Mid Cap 
 
Table 5.2 Cumulative Average Abnormal Return- Mid Cap 
 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,016 8,20E-05 1,797 0,036 1,602 0,054 0,023
1 Day After Report 0,019 9,02E-05 1,998 0,023 2,016 0,022 0,025
3 Days After Report 0,018 9,84E-05 1,855 0,032 1,895 0,029 0,051
5 Days After Report 0,015 1,07E-04 1,479 0,070 1,502 0,067 0,082
10 Days After Report 0,021 1,27E-04 1,887 0,030 1,946 0,023 0,080
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon Shapiro-Wilk
 
 
 
In the right column Shapiro-Wilk’s normality test is shown. In the case of Mid Cap the three 
longest event windows are normally distributed whereas the two shorter windows are not. The 
CAAR from the first day in the event window until the day before the report is significant 
according to Student’s t-test but not to Wilcoxon´s test. Since the normality test suggest that 
the sample is not normally distributed the result of the Wilcoxon test is the appropriate one to 
consider. The CAAR until the first day after the report is significant according to Wilcoxon’s 
test. As can be seen above two of the three longest event windows have significant abnormal 
returns according to both the Wilcoxon test and Student’s t-test. Since the p-value from the 
normality test suggest that the sample almost is normally distributed it is good that both 
Wilcoxon’s test and Student’s t-test gives the same result in those cases. The result presented 
above implies that it can be beneficial to mimic insiders in Mid Cap firms.   
5.2.1.3 Small Cap 
 
Table 5.3 Cumulative Average Abnormal Return- Small Cap 
 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,013 1,28E-04 1,191 0,117 1,660 0,048 0,000
1 Day After Report 0,008 1,40E-04 0,689 0,245 1,603 0,054 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,008 1,53E-04 0,616 0,269 1,294 0,098 0,000
5 Days After Report 0,011 1,66E-04 0,817 0,207 1,624 0,052 0,000
10 Days After Report 0,015 1,98E-04 1,040 0,149 1,151 0,125 0,001
Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
 
The normality test for the all the different event windows for Small Cap observations suggests 
that Wilcoxon’s test should be used. The CAAR from the first day in the event window until 
the day before the report is statistically significant at the 5% level but the other lengths of the 
event windows show no significant abnormal return.  
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5.2.1.4 Analysis: Firm Size 
The market´s information and knowledge about firms differs depending on their size, due to 
more analyst coverage etc. Consequently, the largest firms should therefore have higher 
transparency, thus experience less information asymmetry. The result that outsiders do not 
have the ability obtain significant abnormal returns by imitating insiders at Large Cap firms, 
confirms that hypothesis. It is only at three days after the report the cumulative abnormal 
average return is significant and still, it is not with any wide marginal. This could be the result 
of the market´s ability to quickly incorporate the news of the insider’s transactions, making 
outsiders less likely to make abnormal returns by following insiders. 
   The result confirms and develops the findings of both Cheuk et al. (2006) and Wong et al. 
(2000) that find that insiders’ abnormal gain is possible at the smallest firms. They do not find 
anything significant about outsider’s ability to mimic insiders at Large Cap firms, which is 
similar to this study. It shows positive CAARs only for the event window ending three days 
after the release of the reports. The other event windows shows far from significant abnormal 
returns and therefore, one can conclude that it would not be a good strategy to mimic insiders 
at firms listed at Large Cap. 
   For Mid Cap the result is not as intuitive as at Large Cap, where it only shows abnormal 
returns in one of all cases. The firms at Mid Cap have to be considered quite large and also 
subject to a lot of analysis. The results suggest that abnormal profits are possible at one, three 
and ten days after the report, which is the full time frame of the study. At one and three days 
the result is not as surprising as for ten days since one might imagine that the market needs 
some time to incorporate the news into the stock price. Ten days is a long time and clearly, 
the result for the longest period is not coherent with the semi-strong form of the efficient 
market hypothesis. Instead this is explained by Michaely et al. (1995) that show that the 
market is slow to react and often underreact to news announcements. 
   The results by Cheuk et al. (2006) and Wong et al. (2000) are almost the opposite of what 
this study finds for Mid Cap. They do not find abnormal returns for neither insiders nor 
outsiders for the mid size firms, while positive CAARs are found for three out of four event 
windows after the report in this study. The reason for the deviating results in this study might 
be the effect of the earnings announcement. In their study they do not incorporate the news 
effect and therefore it might be the deciding factor. For this to be true the average earnings 
announcement at Mid Cap must have been surprisingly positive, so that the market was not 
able to anticipate it fully. It is explained by the findings of Ball and Kothari (1991) that says 
that the variance and betas increase after a news announcement, which would make larger 
fluctuations more probable and also thus increasing the likelihood of abnormal returns. The 
higher variance at the time of the news announcement might explain the fact that there are no 
positive CAARs for the event window ending five days after the report, whereas there are 
positive CAARs both before and after. This is related to the findings of Ball and Kothari 
(1991).  
   At Small Cap, all days in the event window except the day prior to the report show no 
significant CAAR. Compared with previous empirical studies this result is surprising. It 
contradicts the findings of Cheuk et al. (2006) and Wong et al. (2000) as mentioned above 
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about Large Cap. Ball and Kothari´s (1991) results of higher variance in smaller firms are 
however confirmed by this study.  
   Possible explanation for the divergent results can be the researched market and the time 
period. The Swedish stock market might have other characteristics than the markets in other 
studies. Also the years 2007-2010, was extreme in many aspects and since at least two of the 
years are considered to be crisis years this might have struck the smallest firms the hardest. 
   Comparing the results of the mid price to the results from the other three quotes in 
Appendix 8.6, the biggest difference is with the close price that finds three, five and four 
abnormal returns out of five possible for Large, Mid and Small Cap respectively. For the bid 
and ask prices the results suggests to use the insider mimicking strategy at the largest firms, 
where the significant CAARs are the most common. The reason for the large difference 
between the results at the different price series might be that the smallest firms have the 
largest spread, since some of them are not as frequently traded as the larger firms. The results 
from the other quotes are similar to the mid price result, the opposite of what Lakonishok and 
Lee (2001) find when they conclude that the informational content of insider transactions are 
greatest for the smallest firms. According to them you should have the most benefit from 
insiders in smaller firms, which is in contradiction to the findings of this study. 
    As concluding remarks one can say that the best chance for outsiders to gain abnormal 
returns by mimicking insiders is at Mid Cap, but since the results differs between days one 
can conclude that it would be risky to base the insider strategy strictly on firm size. The result 
is neither conclusive when comparing with other quotes. To improve the results it is probably 
better to include some other variable as well.    
5.2.2 Kind of Insider 
In this subsection the results from the tests conducted is presented based on kind of insider, 
with four different kinds of insiders; CEO / Vice President, Board Member, Large 
Shareholders and Others. No consideration is taken to the size of the firm or what year the 
transactions are made.  
5.2.2.1 CEO / Vice President 
 
Table 5.4 Cumulative Average Abnormal Return- CEO / Vice President 
 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,023 6,65E-05 2,824 0,002 2,613 0,004 0,393
1 Day After Report 0,028 7,32E-05 3,238 0,001 3,351 0,001 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,026 7,98E-05 2,918 0,002 3,089 0,001 0,001
5 Days After Report 0,026 8,65E-05 2,745 0,003 2,960 0,002 0,000
10 Days After Report 0,021 1,03E-04 2,076 0,019 1,928 0,027 0,005
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon Shapiro-Wilk
 
 
 
The normality test suggests that Wilcoxon’s test shall be used in all cases except the event 
window that ends on the day before the report. In that case the underlying assumption about 
the distribution of the population does hold and therefore is Student’s t-test preferable.  
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As can be seen in the table above all lengths of the event window show significantly positive 
abnormal returns for the studied period with CAARs ranging from 2,1-2,8% for a period of 
24-35 days.   
5.2.2.2 Board Member 
 
Table 5.5 Cumulative Average Abnormal Return- Board Member 
 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,010 4,04E-05 1,632 0,051 1,747 0,040 0,000
1 Day After Report 0,010 4,45E-05 1,570 0,058 2,122 0,017 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,011 4,85E-05 1,541 0,062 1,666 0,048 0,000
5 Days After Report 0,011 5,26E-05 1,568 0,058 1,719 0,043 0,000
10 Days After Report 0,013 6,27E-05 1,626 0,052 1,339 0,091 0,000
Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
 
According to the normality test Wilcoxon’s test should be used instead of Student’s t-test. As 
can be seen, there is positive CAAR for four out of five different lengths of the event window 
when outsiders follow the board members insider transactions. The cumulative average 
abnormal return ranges from 1-1,3% when outsiders follow board members’ transactions and 
is statistically significant at the 5%-level. 
5.2.2.3 Large Shareholders 
 
Table 5.6 Cumulative Average Abnormal Return- Large Shareholder 
 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,016 1,86E-04 1,159 0,123 1,297 0,094 0,386
1 Day After Report 0,012 2,05E-04 0,832 0,203 1,173 0,121 0,047
3 Days After Report 0,006 2,24E-04 0,426 0,335 0,845 0,199 0,012
5 Days After Report 0,008 2,42E-04 0,482 0,315 0,801 0,212 0,040
10 Days After Report 0,018 2,89E-04 1,070 0,142 1,102 0,135 0,409
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon Shapiro-Wilk
 
 
 
According to the Shapiro-Wilk normality test Wilcoxon’s test should be used for the CAARs 
for 1 day after the report, 3 days after the report and 5 days after the report. Student’s t-test is 
used in the two other cases. As can be seen above there are no possibilities to obtain abnormal 
returns by mimicking the behaviour of large shareholders.  
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5.2.2.4 Others 
 
Table 5.7 Cumulative Average Abnormal Return- Others 
 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,016 4,77E-05 2,334 0,010 2,213 0,014 0,000
1 Day After Report 0,018 5,25E-05 2,460 0,007 3,268 0,001 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,021 5,73E-05 2,734 0,003 3,435 0,001 0,000
5 Days After Report 0,024 6,20E-05 2,987 0,001 3,556 0,000 0,000
10 Days After Report 0,024 7,40E-05 2,792 0,003 3,063 0,001 0,000
Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
 
In the table above Wilcoxon’s test should be used for all cases since the assumption about 
normality is rejected according to Shapiro-Wilk’s test. The p-values from Wilcoxon’s tests 
are below 5% for the five different lengths of the event window, suggesting that outsiders can 
achieve abnormal returns by imitating the insider category Others’ behaviour.   
5.2.2.5 Analysis: Kind of Insider 
When mimicking the CEO / Vice President there are positive CAARs for all different lengths 
of the event windows. This suggests that they have information that the market does not have 
at the time of their transactions. It is quite intuitive that the CEO and the Vice President have 
the most information among the insiders and the informational content of their transactions is 
thus quite large. As can be seen above the returns for mimicking CEO/Vice President is 
approximately twice the return for mimicking Board Members. This is consistent with 
previous studies that show that the returns are higher the more information the insider is likely 
to have. 
   The results for the board members are quite intuitive as well. In four out of five lengths of 
the event window the cumulative average abnormal return is statistically higher than zero. 
Only for the longest event window, ending ten days after the report, the CAAR is not 
significantly higher than zero. This suggests that the market is quite slow to react to the news 
announcement, but somewhere between five days to ten days after the report is the 
information incorporated into the stock price.  
   The results based on following large shareholders are quite intuitive. They are unlikely to 
have any superior information and even if the CAARs are positive they are not statistically 
different from zero for any of the event windows. The number of signals for large 
shareholders is quite few during the studied period. This might be related to the fact that they 
care more about long-term return than short-term gains and therefore not transact to a large 
extent prior to earnings announcement. They may also care about having a diversified 
portfolio of stocks, which in that case also can explain the result to some extent.  
   When it comes to the results based on the category of others the results is very interesting. 
According to this, outsiders are able to obtain abnormal returns by mimicking insiders in this 
category. The insiders included in this category can have various connections to the firm, such 
as lawyers, accountants, but also family of the CEO and similar. It is therefore hard to draw 
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any real conclusion about this particular group. One can however argue that the insiders in 
this category are likely to have information superior to the large shareholders, maybe due to 
their relation to persons with much inside information. Therefore, the result might be 
explained partly by their connections to other insiders with more information. Any clear 
conclusion about the result is hard to make since the group can be very diversified.   
   This study can be related to several previous studies performed at different markets. Seyhun 
performed a study of the US stock market in 1986 where he find that the more information 
insiders have the better ability do they have to predict future stock price movements. 
Outsiders ability to obtain abnormal returns by mimicking insiders were however limited 
once transaction costs were considered.  
   In contradiction to Seyhun’s findings the result of this study suggests that outsiders can 
obtain abnormal return by mimicking insiders even after considering transaction costs. The 
CAARs are higher the more information the insiders have and are in that sense similar to 
Seyhun’s findings. When it comes to abnormal returns and transaction costs the results differ. 
This difference in results may be related to the different time period and different markets in 
the studies. The time period Seyhun’s study covered ended approximately 30 years ago, 
making any real conclusion about the differences hard to make. The analyst coverage is much 
higher in today’s corporate environment. With the evolution of Internet the information about 
companies is spread to the entire world instantaneously. These are just a few examples of 
what might have changed during the last 30 years that can explain the differences in results.  
   The results of this study are more similar to the findings of Jaffe (1974) who as well as 
Seyhun studied the US market. Jaffe incorporated the intensity of the trading in his study and 
find that in the case of intensive trading abnormal returns are possible for outsiders even after 
considering transaction costs. No variable about the intensity is included in this study making 
comparisons between the studies quite hard but the results are similar in the sense that 
outsiders are able to obtain abnormal returns by following insiders.  
   Brio and Miguel (2010) study the stock market in Spain and they find that the informational 
content of insider trading is more important than dividends changes. If the informational 
content were similar in Sweden it is more likely that the market adjusts fast when the insiders 
make transactions. Since abnormal returns are possible even after 30 days in several cases it is 
unlikely that the informational content of insiders trading is as high in Sweden as in Spain.  
   A more recent article by Korczak et al. (2010) find positive correlation between insiders 
purchasing stocks and the performance of the stock after a news announcement. The 
correlation is strongest for the group with most informed investors, also consistent with the 
findings of Inci et al. (2010). This study also finds a positive correlation between the 
informed insiders and the returns. Since both this study and Korczak et al. have similar time 
horizons and are made recently the similar results suggests that the Swedish market and the 
UK market are similar in at least some sense when it comes to insider trading. The more 
information the insiders have the more information is conveyed to the market when they 
transact. Looking at the CAAR for the different categories it can be seen that it is the highest 
when mimicking the CEO / Vice President, followed by Others and Board Members. Since 
abnormal returns are possible when following three of the four groups the Swedish stock 
market shows some signs of being at least partially inefficient.  
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   In Appendix 8.7 the results are presented for the other prices included in this study. The 
results are similar as for the mid quotes. The more information the insider has the more 
informative are the transactions. Following large shareholders does not seem to be that good, 
but following the other three categories is associated with significantly positive CAARs in 
most cases.  
 According to the findings of this study it is a good investment strategy for outsiders to base 
their investments on insiders’ transactions. The more information the insider has the more 
useful is the transaction when it comes to predicting future stock price movement.  
5.2.3 Market-to-Book Value 
The companies included in this study are divided into four different categories depending on 
Market-to-Book value. In this section the tests based on this categorization is presented.  
5.2.3.1 Quartile 1 (0-25%) 
 
Table 5.8 Cumulative Average Abnormal Return- Quartile 1 
 
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Shapiro-Wilk
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,015 1,11E-04 1,406 0,080 1,689 0,045 0,001
1 Day After Report 0,002 1,22E-04 0,170 0,432 1,387 0,083 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,002 1,33E-04 0,181 0,428 1,319 0,094 0,000
5 Days After Report 0,000 1,44E-04 0,028 0,489 1,106 0,135 0,000
10 Days After Report -0,001 1,72E-04 -0,105 0,542 0,798 0,213 0,000
Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
 
As can be seen in the normality test the assumption about the normal distribution does not 
hold for any of the lengths of the event windows and therefore is Wilcoxon’s test used. The 
CAAR ending on the day before the report is significantly positive but the other CAARs are 
not.  
5.2.3.2 Quartile 2 (26-50%) 
 
Table 5.9 Cumulative Average Abnormal Return- Quartile 2 
 
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Shapiro-Wilk
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,010 1,03E-04 0,965 0,167 0,966 0,167 0,781
1 Day After Report 0,014 1,14E-04 1,355 0,088 1,731 0,042 0,017
3 Days After Report 0,010 1,24E-04 0,927 0,177 1,424 0,078 0,009
5 Days After Report 0,008 1,34E-04 0,667 0,252 1,127 0,130 0,036
10 Days After Report 0,003 1,60E-04 0,229 0,410 0,649 0,258 0,104
Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
 
The result from the Shapiro-Wilk test suggests that Student’s t-test should be used in the 
CAAR with the shortest event window and the longest. The three lengths in the middle are 
 ! Insider Trading at the Swedish Stock Market 
- To What Extent Can the Behavior of Insiders be Mimicked to Obtain Abnormal Returns? 
!
! !
45 
 
analysed with the help of Wilcoxon’s test. The CAARs ranges between 0,3-1,4% but none of 
the CAARs are significantly greater than zero.  
5.2.3.3 Quartile 3 (51-75%) 
 
Table 5.10 Cumulative Average Abnormal Return- Quartile 3 
 
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Shapiro-Wilk
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,026 1,05E-04 2,518 0,006 2,639 0,004 0,000
1 Day After Report 0,030 1,16E-04 2,779 0,003 2,385 0,008 0,092
3 Days After Report 0,034 1,26E-04 3,024 0,001 2,462 0,007 0,026
5 Days After Report 0,034 1,37E-04 2,942 0,002 2,352 0,009 0,043
10 Days After Report 0,044 1,63E-04 3,428 0,000 2,666 0,004 0,009
Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
 
As can be seen above, the different CAARs for the companies in the third quartile of the 
Market-to-Book value are all positive, ranging between 2,6-4,4%. Both Student’s t-test and 
Wilcoxon’s signed rank test are used and show significantly positive CAARs.  
5.2.3.4 Quartile 4 (76-100%) 
 
Table 5.11 Cumulative Average Abnormal Return- Quartile 4 
 
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Shapiro-Wilk
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,001 1,07E-04 0,141 0,444 0,275 0,391 0,030
1 Day After Report 0,004 1,18E-04 0,385 0,350 0,119 0,453 0,751
3 Days After Report 0,006 1,28E-04 0,545 0,293 0,175 0,431 0,144
5 Days After Report 0,011 1,39E-04 0,950 0,171 0,502 0,308 0,020
10 Days After Report 0,016 1,66E-04 1,230 0,109 0,501 0,305 0,002
Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
 
As can be seen above, the companies with the highest Market-to-Book values show positive 
CAARs for all lengths of the event window. The cumulative average abnormal returns are 
however not statistically significant.   
5.2.3.5 Analysis: Market-to-Book 
In Quartile 1, consisting of the companies with the lowest Market-to-Book values, only one 
event window show significant abnormal returns even if all but one show positive returns. It 
is the event window ending on the day before the report that is associated with positive 
abnormal returns whereas the other event windows show no significant abnormal returns. The 
possibility to obtain abnormal returns by mimicking insider transactions in value firms is thus 
quite limited.  
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   The results in Quartile 2 show similar patterns. The event window ending the day after the 
report shows significantly positive abnormal returns but the other event windows show no 
sign of significant positive returns.  
   The results for the companies included in Quartile 3 are quite interesting. The Market-to-
Book values are somewhat higher among these companies and the cumulative average 
abnormal return is significantly positive for all lengths of the event window. The CAARs 
ranges from 2,6-4,4% which is quite high considering the tight time frame. According to this 
it can be a good idea to follow insiders’ transactions in glamour stocks, or stocks with high 
Market-to-Book values. This can perhaps to some extent be explained by the fact that 
glamour stocks are riskier than value stocks. If the market gets a signal that the stock is 
undervalued, as conveyed by insiders’ transactions, it might overreact to this signal.  
   The results in Quartile 4 disrupt the previous pattern, that value stocks are associated with 
no abnormal return whereas glamour stocks are associated with positive abnormal returns. 
The companies included in this quartile, i.e. the companies with the highest market-to-book 
values, show no significantly positive CAAR for any of the event windows.  
  Dickgiesser and Kaserer (2009) studied the German stock market and among other things 
study insider transactions connected to the Market-to-Book values of the companies. They 
find that insiders are more active in stocks with bad past performance. They also find that 
insiders purchasing value stocks often are associated with large changes in the share price. In 
the case of glamour stocks insiders’ purchases tend to be followed by small changes in share 
price.  
   The results from this study are both similar and different depending on which particular 
group that is considered. The value stocks are associated with small changes after insiders’ 
transactions, which is in contradiction to the findings of Dickgiesser and Kaserer. The result 
for the third quartile is also in contradiction to their findings. Since the distinction between 
value stocks and glamour stocks only is relative in this study no clear comparison can be 
made to Dickgiesser and Kaserer’s results when it comes to the two middle quartiles. The 
companies in the fourth quartile have the highest market-to-book values. It can be compared 
to Dickgiesser and Kaserer’s general findings that insiders purchasing glamour stocks are 
associated with small changes. The findings from this study and theirs are thus comparable at 
least in that sense. As can be seen in the section with descriptive statistics, Small Cap 
companies are over-represented especially in Quartile 1 and 3 and it is quite evenly 
distributed in the other two quartiles. That might explain some of the result but are in that 
case only seemingly related to Market-to-Book values but the real explanation might be 
differences in firm size. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) for example find that insider trading is 
more informative in Small Cap stocks and that can explain some of the mixed result in this 
study.  
   In Appendix 8.8 the results for Close, Bid and Ask quotes are presented. The result is quite 
similar but diverges in some instances. The general finding is still the same; following 
insiders in companies in the lowest quartile are associated with significantly positive CAARs 
exceptionally, whereas it is quite common for Quartile 2-3. Only in one instance are there 
significant positive CAARs for Quartile 4.  
   Based on the results presented above it is hard to say if there is any real difference among 
the different types of companies. The results are quite mixed and no clear pattern is seen. The 
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results in this study might also be related to the chaotic financial crisis that is included in the 
study with companies of various backgrounds and belonging to different lists have had large 
swings in their Market-to-Book values. Based on the findings in this study it is unwise to base 
an investment strategy solely on insider transactions for different type of Market-to-Book 
companies.  
5.2.4 Financial Crisis / Non-Crisis 
In this section is the tests based on financial crisis / non-crisis presented. The reports released 
for fiscal years 2007 and 2010 are considered to be during non-crisis years, whereas 2008 and 
2009 are considered to be during the recent financial crisis.  
5.2.4.1 Financial Crisis 
5.2.4.1.1 Year 2008 
 
Table 5.12 Cumulative Average Abnormal Return- 2008 
 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,001 1,08E-04 0,091 0,464 0,482 0,325 0,039
1 Day After Report 0,000 1,19E-04 0,001 0,499 0,737 0,231 0,004
3 Days After Report 0,001 1,29E-04 0,117 0,453 0,522 0,301 0,075
5 Days After Report -0,002 1,40E-04 -0,155 0,561 0,257 0,398 0,030
10 Days After Report 0,004 1,67E-04 0,327 0,372 0,328 0,372 0,016
Wilcoxon Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test
 
 
 
During the first year of the financial crisis the CAAR ranges from -0,2-0,4%. Student’s t-test 
is used for the CAAR ending three days after the report and Wilcoxon’s test is used for the 
other CAARs. The CAARs are not significantly higher than zero for any of the observations.  
5.2.4.1.2 Year 2009 
 
Table 5.13 Cumulative Average Abnormal Return- 2009 
 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,002 2,01E-04 0,159 0,437 0,107 0,458 0,017
1 Day After Report -0,011 2,21E-04 -0,733 0,768 0,585 0,276 0,048
3 Days After Report -0,017 2,41E-04 -1,063 0,856 0,799 0,212 0,015
5 Days After Report -0,012 2,61E-04 -0,724 0,766 0,491 0,312 0,233
10 Days After Report -0,018 3,11E-04 -1,046 0,852 1,059 0,148 0,071
Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
 
As can be seen in the table above, all CAARs except one was negative during the period 
around the report for fiscal year 2009. Both Student’s t-test and Wilcoxon’s test shows no 
significant abnormal return in either direction. Following insiders during financial crisis is 
thus unlikely to lead to abnormal returns.  
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5.2.4.2 Non-Crisis 
5.2.4.2.1 Year 2007 
 
Table 5.14 Cumulative Average Abnormal Return- 2007 
 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,028 5,33E-05 3,795 0,000 3,112 0,001 0,005
1 Day After Report 0,030 5,86E-05 3,886 0,000 3,246 0,001 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,034 6,39E-05 4,244 0,000 3,446 0,000 0,000
5 Days After Report 0,036 6,93E-05 4,299 0,000 3,608 0,000 0,000
10 Days After Report 0,037 8,26E-05 4,026 0,000 3,053 0,001 0,001
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon Shapiro-Wilk
 
 
 
The normality test shows that the result from Wilcoxon’s test is the most relevant since the 
assumptions behind Student’s t-test do not hold. The CAAR ranges from 2,8-3,7% and is 
statistically significant at the 5%-level. Following insiders at the Swedish stock market during 
2007 were associated with positive CAARs for the time around the release of the report.  
5.2.4.2.2 Year 2010 
 
Table 5.15 Cumulative Average Abnormal Return- 2010 
 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,013 1,05E-04 1,295 0,098 0,415 0,339 0,000
1 Day After Report 0,024 1,16E-04 2,202 0,014 1,745 0,040 0,004
3 Days After Report 0,021 1,26E-04 1,890 0,029 1,403 0,081 0,008
5 Days After Report 0,020 1,37E-04 1,700 0,045 1,432 0,076 0,073
10 Days After Report 0,022 1,63E-04 1,715 0,043 1,632 0,051 0,060
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon Shapiro-Wilk
 
 
 
Wilcoxon’s signed rank test is used for the three shortest event windows and Student’s t-test 
is used for the two longest. The CAARs are positive in all cases, ranging from 1,3-2,4% and it 
is statistically significant for three of the different CAARs at the 5%-level. Following insiders 
at the Swedish stock market were associated with abnormal returns for the period around the 
release of the report for fiscal year 2010. 
5.2.4.3 Analysis: Financial Crisis / Non-Crisis 
The first year in the recent financial crisis is 2008. The CAARs are approximately zero for all 
the different event windows. No event window shows any sign of positive abnormal return. 
The results are quite intuitive; since the stock markets around the world were steadily 
decreasing it would be unlikely to get a result where the abnormal returns are positive, even 
during the time around reports announcement. Number of buy transactions during the year of 
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2008 decreased somewhat from the year before. Abmustafa and Nusair (2011) find in their 
study that aggregate insider trading increases during crisis, mainly due to increasing sell 
transactions. The number of sell transactions is approximately the same for all the years 
included in this study, which contradicts the results from Abmustafa and Nusair.  They 
studied the US and Kuwait market and that can explain some of the differences in results. 
Still, one expects the sales to increase due to lower personal liquidity level.  
   In 2009, all CAARs except one are negative but none of them statistically different from 
zero. The number of buy transactions decreased quite substantially between 2008 and 2009, 
which can be due to personal liquidity needs. One reasons that the insiders does not increase 
the sell transactions might be due to them trying to avoid a sure loss. By decreasing the buy 
transactions instead they might be able to handle their liquidity needs anyway.  
   The year before the outbreak of the financial crisis was a very good year. The CAAR ranges 
between 2,8-3,7% and are significantly different from zero in all instances. There was an 
overall pressure upwards in many different segments and this can explain some of the 
substantial returns associated with following insiders during 2007. If outsiders are able to spot 
the upcoming changes in the market, following insiders prior to a downward movement is 
really good with large returns.  
   Three of the five different event windows in 2010 are associated with significantly positive 
CAARs. The overall recovery of the market was good during this year but some industries, 
such as the car manufacturing industry were still struggling.  
   Seyhun (1988) studied insider transactions during good and bad financial conditions. He 
find that no real conclusion can be drawn about when the transactions are most informative, 
but they can be used to spot overall changes in the market. This study differs somewhat from 
Seyhun’s since the result from mimicking insiders is much better during the good or normal 
times than during financial crisis. Sell transactions were however not incorporated in this 
study and that can perhaps affect the result to some extent. Seyhun studied the US stock 
market and that can also explain some of the differences in the results. The remuneration in 
US firms is to a larger extent variable than it is in Swedish firms. If for example CEO:s have a 
large portion of their wealth tied in their company’s stock and their fixed remuneration is 
quite low they might be forced to sell shares in order to handle their personal liquidity needs.  
   Jiang and Zaman (2010) study aggregate insider trading and the ability to predict future 
market movements by the use of this information. They find strong support of insiders’ ability 
to predict future unexpected cash-flow news and they relate this to future stock price 
movements. They only study insiders and not the ability for outsiders to mimic insiders. By 
including that feature in this study it can be said that outsiders can use the information of 
insiders’ transaction in order to spot future price movements.  
  The results for the different quotes are presented in Appendix 8.9. The overall result is the 
same even if some of the event windows differ.  
   The results from this study show that insiders’ transactions should not be mimicked during a 
financial crisis. It can however be a good idea to follow the insiders during good or normal 
times. Since the annual reports are released after the movement of the market already is 
established it is quite straightforward to know when insiders’ behaviour should or should not 
be mimicked. 
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6 Concluding Discussion 
In this chapter there is a concluding discussion about the results in this study. Thoughts about 
the reasons for the particular results are expressed as well. There is also a part with 
proposals of further studies in the field of insider trading.  
6.1 Concluding Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to see if there was an easy straightforward way to obtain 
abnormal returns for investors. Since insiders are likely to have information that outsiders’ 
have not, there can be information conveyed to the market when insiders transact. The time 
during the release of the companies’ full year reports were considered since it is more likely 
that the stock price is affected in either direction at the time of the release.  
   In order to determine to what extent outsiders are able to mimic insiders to obtain abnormal 
return and when the possibilities are the best several separations were made. If outsiders can 
obtain abnormal returns by mimicking insiders’ transactions the semi-strong form of the 
efficient market hypothesis can be rejected.  
 
The result from this study suggests that outsiders can mimic the behaviour of insiders’ 
transactions in order to obtain abnormal returns in some instances. Several separations were 
made in order to determine when the possibility for abnormal returns was the highest. The 
conclusion from this study is that it is best to mimic the insiders’ with most information since 
this will lead to the highest abnormal returns and there is a detailed discussion about the 
different results in the previous chapter. It is intuitive that more information is conveyed to 
the market when insiders with more information make transactions. The abnormal returns 
associated with mimicking CEO/Vice President, Board Members and Others are significantly 
positive in most occasions. Following Large Shareholders is however not associated with any 
abnormal returns. It can be somewhat unexpected that mimicking the category Others shows 
positive results whereas Large Shareholders does not. We argue that this can be due to the 
persons in the category Others might have closer relationship to the most informed insiders 
and therefore have more information than Large Shareholders and Board Members. Large 
Shareholders on the other hand often have a portfolio consisting on several different stocks, 
making it hard for them to be that well informed about each company.  
   In this research field the signalling hypothesis is of high importance. By making a 
transaction, insiders convey information to the market about the future prospect of the firm. 
The informational content is likely to be the highest for the insiders with the most 
information, which also is confirmed by this study. We argue that insiders in high positions, 
such as CEOs, have to be careful when making transactions since their action will send strong 
signals to outsiders. At the same time it might also be used as an effective tool to mislead 
outsiders to invest in a stock even if the insider know that the inside information is not 
positive. That might lead to higher returns at least in the short term but in the long term the 
market will probably incorporate the true information leading to a decreased stock price.       
   Regarding the size of the firm this study shows that the abnormal returns are highest for 
Mid Cap firms, followed by Large Cap and Small Cap. The findings are partly in 
contradiction to previous research that shows that the abnormal returns are the highest when 
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mimicking Small Cap companies (e.g., Cheuk et al. 2006; Wong et al. 2000). The result from 
this study is in that sense quite unexpected since the information asymmetry is likely to be the 
highest for Small Cap companies and the information conveyed by the insiders should 
therefore be the highest for Small Cap companies. Since the recent financial crisis is 
incorporated in this study this might affect the result. Investors might be especially cautious 
and reluctant to invest in Small Cap firms that are considered to be riskier, during economic 
turmoil. As described in the section about validity and reliability there is also an issue of the 
explanatory power of the market model. The model performs very well for Large and Mid 
Cap firms, but the performance is poorer for Small Cap firms. This can affect the result in 
either direction and in this case it might be a downward bias.    
   The results based on the different Market-to-Book categories are quite mixed and no real 
conclusion can therefore be drawn. Previous studies suggest that there is a negative 
correlation between Market-to-Book ratio and abnormal return, i.e. mimicking insiders in 
value stocks is associated with higher returns. We find that the highest return is obtained 
when outsiders follow insiders in the two middle quartiles, which is in contradiction to the 
findings of Dickgiesser and Kaserer (2010). The two middle categories are likely to consist of 
firms with higher risk than pure value stocks but lower risk than pure glamour stocks. We 
believe that this can affect the result in this study since investors are reluctant to purchase 
shares in the riskiest companies but want returns higher than the ones expected in value 
stocks. By purchasing shares in companies in the two middle quartiles the expected returns is 
likely to be higher than for value stocks, at a risk lower than the one associated with glamour 
stocks. This seems like a reasonable explanation for the somewhat unexpected results that 
probably is influenced by the financial turmoil during part of the studied period.  
   The last thing considered in this study was if the possibilities for abnormal returns were 
affected by the condition of the financial markets. We find that the abnormal returns are 
higher during times when it is not financial crisis than during financial crisis and the abnormal 
returns were the highest for 2007, followed by 2010, whereas there were now abnormal 
returns for 2008-2009. This contradicts the findings of Seyhun (1988) that finds no difference 
depending on the condition of the financial markets. We think that the market model performs 
poorer during times of economic turmoil and this can of course influence the end result. 
Almost half of the companies included in this study are Small Cap companies and it is 
reasonable to think that they perform worse than Large or Mid Cap companies during crisis. 
We argue that the predominance of Small Cap companies can put a downward pressure on the 
abnormal returns, and this can partially explain the deviation from Seyhun’s (1988) study.  
 
As concluding remarks, it is best to follow the insiders with the most information, such as the 
CEO or the Vice President. This study finds no clear relationship between firm size and the 
possibility for outsiders to obtain abnormal returns by mimicking insiders. Regarding the 
Market-to-Book values of the companies the results of this study is quite scattered and no 
clear conclusion about the explanatory power of the Market-to-Book values can be drawn. 
The overall financial condition is important regarding the possibilities for abnormal returns, 
with bad overall financial condition associated with zero or even negative abnormal returns. 
The consideration of the Bid-Ask spread makes the result of this study more reliable than 
other master theses that have neglected this transaction cost. The Swedish stock market shows 
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sign of being at least partially inefficient according to the semi-strong form of the efficient 
market hypothesis. This inefficiency opens up possibilities to use other methods to forecast 
future stock price changes. We argue that the Swedish financial community ought to pay 
attention to the information conveyed by insiders’ transactions. Insiders must also be careful 
when making their transactions since this sends a strong signal to the market, especially in the 
case of insiders with substantial information advantage. 
6.1.1 Proposals for Further Research  
This study has reached some conclusions about outsiders’ ability to mimic insiders’ prior to a 
news announcement. There are still some parts that are left untested or could be improved by 
future research: 
 
! This study has done some breakdowns and separations and only looked at one variable 
at the time. One way to improve the result might be by including several variables at 
the same time. Future studies can run a multiple regression analysis and connect two 
or more variables, which might improve the predictability of the stock price 
movements.  
 
! The results from this study are with certainty only applicable at the Swedish stock 
market. Future research could make a similar study at some other market to see if the 
results hold there as well. A lot of studies have investigated the US market, but it 
could be interesting to make studies similar to this one on smaller markets where the 
information asymmetry is likely to be higher.  
 
! Instead of just study the net purchases a good idea could be to include the net sales 
and see if abnormal returns are possible when the share price goes down more than 
expected by the market. One way to do this would be trough the usage of short sales 
when insiders sell their shares.  
 
! This study only looked at the earnings announcement for the full fiscal year that 
comes through the fourth quarter report. During a year there are more reports that 
could be subject to similar investigation to see if the results hold for them as well.  
 
! In this study the market model have been used to determine the normal stock price 
behaviour. The explanatory power of this model is quite low for Small Cap companies. 
Future studies might use other capital pricing models for the Small Cap companies, in 
order to improve the explanatory power of the model and thus the usefulness of the 
result.  
 
! The only transaction cost considered in this study is the Bid-Ask spread, since that it 
the only cost common for all type of investors. It could be interesting to consider other 
transaction costs as well, such as commission fees and similar. Future research in this 
field might include these other transaction costs in order to make the result even more 
reliable.  
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8 Appendices 
8.1 Included Companies 
8.1.1 Included Companies I- Currently Listed Companies 
Large Cap Tele2 Loomis CellaVision Nederman Holding
ABB TeliaSonera Medivir Cision Netonnet
Alfa Laval Trelleborg Mekonomen Cloetta Nordic Mines
Alliance Oil Volvo Net Insight Concordia Maritime Nordic Service Partner Holdings
Assa Abloy Mid Cap New Wave Connecta Note
Atlas Copco AarhusKarlsosn NIBE Industry Consilium Novestra
Autoliv Active Biotech Niscayah Group CTT Systems Novotek
Axfood Addtech Nobia Cybercom Group Oasmia Pharmaceutical
Boliden Arise Windpower Nolato Dagon OEM International
Castellum Atrium Ljungberg Nordnet DGC One Opcon
Electrolux Avanza Bank Orc Software Digital Vision Orexo
Elekta Axis PA Resources Diös Fastigheter Ortivus 
Ericsson B&B Tools Proffice Doro PartnerTech
Fabege BE Group Rezidor Hotels Duroc Phonera
Getinge Beijer Alma Sagax Elanders Poolia 
Hakon Invest Betsson SAS Electra Gruppen Precise Biometrics
Hennes & Mauritz Bilia SkiStar ElektronikGruppen Prevas 
Hexagon Billerud Sweco Elos Pricer 
Holmen BioInvent International Swedish Orpan Enea Proact IT Group
Hufvudstaden Björn Borg Systemair eWork Scandinavia Probi
Husqvarna Black Earth Farming SäkI Feelgood Svenska Profilgruppen
Industrivärden Brinova Fastighet TradeDoubler Fingerprint Cards RaySearch Laboratories
Investor Bure Equity Transcom FormPipe Solution ReadSoft 
Kinnevik Cardo Unibet Group Geveko Rederi AB Transatlantic
Latour Clas Ohlson Wallenstam Global Health Care Rejlerkoncernen
Lundbergföretagen Corem Properties Wihlborgs Fastigheter Havsfrun Investment RNB Retail and Brands
Lundin Mining Diamyd Medicals Vostok Nafta Hemtex Rottneros
Lundin Petroleum Duni ÅF HMS Networks Rörvik Timber
Meda East Capital Öresund Intellecta Sectra
Melker Schörling Eniro Small Cap Intoi Semcon
Modern Times Group Fagerhult Acando ITAB Shop Concepts Sensys Traffic
NCC Fast Partner ACAP Invest Jeeves Information Systems Sigma 
Nordea Bank Fast. Balder A-Com Kabe SinterCast
Peab Fenix Outdoor Addnode Karo Bio Softronic 
Ratos Gunnebo Aerocrine Know IT Studsvik
SAAB Haldex AllTele Lagercrantz Group Svedbergs 
Sandvik Heba Anoto Group Lammhults Design Group Swedol 
SCA Hexpol Artimplant LinkMed Svolder 
Scania HiQ International Aspiro Luxonen SDB Traction 
SEB Höganäs Avega Group Malmbergs Elektriska Uniflex 
Seco Tools IFS Beijer Electronics Metro International VBG Group
Securitas Indutrade Bergs Timber Micronic Mydata Venue Retail Group
Skanska Intrum Justitia BioGaia Midsona Vitrolife
SKF JM BioPhausia Midway XANO Industri
SSAB KappAhl Biotage Mobyson
Svenska Handelsbanken Klövern Bong Ljungdahl Morphic Technologies
Swedbank Kungsleden BTS Group MSC Konsult
Swedish Match Lindab International Catena MultiQ International
Companies in italics have been exluded at least one of the studied years for different reasons, among them; Missing information from 
Datastream and Missing information from FI.  
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8.1.2 Companies Included II- Delisted Companies 
Large Cap Q-Med Din Bostad Oxigene Inc
Nobel Biocare Securitas Direkt AB HL Display Skanditek Industriförvaltning AB
Mid Cap Telelogic Human Care HC AB Svithoid Tankers AB
Broström Small Cap KMT Group SwitchCore AB
Cardo AcadeMedia LBI International Teligent AB
Carnegie & Co AB Affärsstrategerna AB Ledstiernan Ticket Travel Group
Fazer Konfektyr Audiodev AB Modul 1 Data Tricorona
Gant Biolin Scientific Neonet XponCard Group AB
Gunnebo Industrier Borås Wäfveri AB Netonnet Zodiak Television AB
Home Properties Boss Media Nexus Technology AB
HQ AB Carl Lamm AB Nilörngruppen
Munters AB CashGuard AB NovaCast Technologies AB
No information about the lists the companies belonged to prior to being delisted were found. An 
approximation was made by the help of the market values for the companies. 
 
8.2 Excluded Companies 
8.2.1 Companies Excluded I- Currently Listed Companies 
Large Cap Comment Net Entertainment Data missing from Datastream
AstraZeneca No info from FI Small Cap Comment
Millicom No info from FI Coastal Contacts Data missing from Datastream
Stora Enso No info from FI EpiCept Data missing from Datastream
Tieto Oyj No info from FI Etrion Data missing from Datastream
Oriflame Cosmetics No info from FI MQ Holding Insufficient Information
Mid Cap Comment NAXS Nordic Access Buyout Fund Data missing from Datastream
Byggmax Group Data missing from Datastream Odd Molly Data missing from Datastream
CDON Group Data missing from Datastream PSI Group Data missing from Datastream
EnQuest PLC Data missing from Datastream Trigon Agri Insufficient Information  
8.2.2 Companies Excluded II- Delisted Companies 
Company Comment
ACSC Insufficient information
Invik Insufficient information
Kaupthing Bank Insufficient information
Lindex Delisted in January, FY ending in Aug
Mandator Insufficient information
Nefab AB Delisted in 2007
Old Mutual Plc. Insufficient information
OMX AB No info about report for FY07
Peab Industri Data missing from Datastream
Protect Data Insufficient information
SalusAnsvar Data missing from Datastream
ScanMining Data missing from Datastream
Teleca AB Data missing from Datastream  
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8.3 Number of Signals 
8.3.1 Divided by Lists 
Number of Signals CEO Board Member Large Shareholder Other Total
Large Cap
Number of Buy Signals 38 63 11 56 100
Number of Sell Signals 10 18 3 25 34
Net Zero 1 8 3 3 70
Total Number of Observations 204 204 204 204 204
Mid Cap
Number of Buy Signals 44 90 20 80 123
Number of Sell Signals 27 37 13 44 73
Net Zero 0 2 2 5 116
Total Number of Observations 312 312 312 312 312
Small Cap
Number of Buy Signals 74 123 22 91 196
Number of Sell Signals 19 39 16 53 86
Net Zero 7 16 0 3 250
Total Number of Observations 532 532 532 531 532  
8.3.2 Divided by Years 
Number of Signals CEO Board Member Large Shareholder Other Total
2010
Buy 25 56 16 33 130
Sell 15 21 7 36 79
Net Zero 3 6 0 3 12
Total 43 83 23 72 221
2009
Buy 23 50 11 43 127
Sell 11 23 10 29 73
Net Zero 2 4 2 5 13
Total 36 77 23 77 213
2008
Buy 55 80 12 76 223
Sell 13 28 11 23 75
Net Zero 2 13 2 1 18
Total 70 121 25 100 316
2007
Buy 53 90 14 75 232
Sell 17 22 4 34 77
Net Zero 1 3 1 2 7
Total 71 115 19 111 316  
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8.4 Number of Transactions 
Number of Transactions CEO Board Member Large Shareholder Other Total
Large Cap
Buy 89 280 51 167 587
Sell 19 63 31 65 178
Total 108 343 82 232 765
Mid Cap
Buy 187 334 157 308 986
Sell 81 167 84 147 479
Total 268 501 241 455 1465
Small Cap
Buy 186 535 246 213 1180
Sell 76 173 88 132 469
Total 262 708 334 345 1649  
8.5 Average Explanatory Power 
8.5.1 Mid Price 
2007 2008 2009 2010
Large Cap 38,8% 41,6% 37,0% 55,0%
Mid Cap 21,4% 28,5% 17,7% 34,9%
Small Cap 12,2% 17,0% 7,5% 21,1%  
8.5.2 Close Price 
2007 2008 2009 2010
Large Cap 39,4% 45,2% 36,9% 54,8%
Mid Cap 21,4% 32,5% 17,2% 32,8%
Small Cap 12,1% 18,8% 6,8% 17,8%  
8.5.3 Bid Price 
2007 2008 2009 2010
Large Cap 40,0% 42,2% 40,0% 56,3%
Mid Cap 21,2% 28,2% 17,7% 34,7%
Small Cap 12,0% 16,7% 7,6% 20,8%  
8.5.4 Ask Price 
2007 2008 2009 2010
Large Cap 39,4% 43,1% 38,1% 55,5%
Mid Cap 20,2% 26,8% 16,4% 33,4%
Small Cap 10,7% 14,2% 6,6% 18,3%  
   62  
 
! Insider Trading at the Swedish Stock Market 
- To What Extent Can the Behavior of Insiders be Mimicked to Obtain Abnormal Returns? 
!
! !
8.6 Tests based on Firm Size 
8.6.1 Close Prices 
Large Cap 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,008 7,57E-05 0,896 0,185 1,221 0,111 0,000
1 Day After Report 0,014 8,32E-05 1,526 0,063 1,822 0,034 0,028
3 Days After Report 0,016 9,08E-05 1,660 0,048 1,819 0,034 0,016
5 Days After Report 0,017 9,84E-05 1,687 0,046 1,719 0,043 0,055
10 Days After Report 0,009 1,17E-04 0,786 0,216 1,475 0,070 0,000
Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
Mid Cap 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,018 8,59E-05 1,895 0,029 1,820 0,035 0,020
1 Day After Report 0,020 9,45E-05 2,102 0,018 2,179 0,015 0,010
3 Days After Report 0,021 1,03E-04 2,039 0,021 2,143 0,016 0,031
5 Days After Report 0,020 1,12E-04 1,888 0,030 2,024 0,021 0,048
10 Days After Report 0,025 1,33E-04 2,161 0,015 2,262 0,012 0,001
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon Shapiro-Wilk
 
 
Small Cap 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,017 7,41E-05 1,950 0,026 1,973 0,024 0,006
1 Day After Report 0,012 8,15E-05 1,378 0,084 2,027 0,021 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,011 8,89E-05 1,179 0,119 1,636 0,051 0,000
5 Days After Report 0,014 9,63E-05 1,439 0,075 1,890 0,029 0,000
10 Days After Report 0,021 1,15E-04 1,954 0,025 1,708 0,044 0,000
Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
8.6.2 Bid Prices 
Large Cap 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,007 7,74E-05 0,824 0,205 1,169 0,121 0,015
1 Day After Report 0,016 8,51E-05 1,758 0,039 2,091 0,018 0,019
3 Days After Report 0,018 9,29E-05 1,837 0,033 2,073 0,018 0,070
5 Days After Report 0,019 1,01E-04 1,899 0,029 2,060 0,019 0,021
10 Days After Report 0,012 1,20E-04 1,075 0,141 1,853 0,032 0,000
Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
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Mid Cap 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,010 1,08E-04 0,997 0,159 0,687 0,247 0,022
1 Day After Report 0,016 9,57E-05 1,673 0,047 1,771 0,039 0,044
3 Days After Report 0,016 1,04E-04 1,544 0,061 1,633 0,051 0,050
5 Days After Report 0,013 1,13E-04 1,193 0,116 1,320 0,094 0,073
10 Days After Report 0,018 1,35E-04 1,579 0,057 1,641 0,051 0,007
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon Shapiro-Wilk
 
 
Small Cap 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,011 7,42E-05 1,220 0,111 0,941 0,174 0,000
1 Day After Report 0,008 8,16E-05 0,857 0,196 1,283 0,100 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,007 8,90E-05 0,720 0,236 0,924 0,178 0,000
5 Days After Report 0,012 9,64E-05 1,192 0,117 1,476 0,069 0,000
10 Days After Report 0,013 1,15E-04 1,236 0,108 0,981 0,163 0,000
Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
8.6.3 Ask Prices 
Large Cap 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,010 7,93E-05 1,166 0,122 1,506 0,067 0,000
1 Day After Report 0,016 8,72E-05 1,668 0,048 2,149 0,017 0,002
3 Days After Report 0,017 9,51E-05 1,790 0,037 2,128 0,017 0,005
5 Days After Report 0,019 1,03E-04 1,862 0,031 2,032 0,021 0,028
10 Days After Report 0,011 1,23E-04 0,982 0,163 1,764 0,039 0,000
Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
Mid Cap 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,022 8,62E-05 2,356 0,009 2,464 0,007 0,101
1 Day After Report 0,021 9,48E-05 2,205 0,014 2,283 0,011 0,014
3 Days After Report 0,021 1,03E-04 2,056 0,020 2,063 0,019 0,065
5 Days After Report 0,018 1,12E-04 1,679 0,047 1,683 0,041 0,104
10 Days After Report 0,024 1,34E-04 2,085 0,019 2,166 0,015 0,010
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon Shapiro-Wilk
 
 
Small Cap 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,015 7,53E-05 1,782 0,037 1,724 0,043 0,001
1 Day After Report 0,009 8,28E-05 0,984 0,163 1,550 0,061 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,010 9,03E-05 1,078 0,140 1,411 0,078 0,000
5 Days After Report 0,012 9,78E-05 1,183 0,118 1,560 0,059 0,000
10 Days After Report 0,018 1,17E-04 1,645 0,050 1,322 0,093 0,001
Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
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8.7 Kind of Insider 
8.7.1 Close Price 
CEO / Vice President 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,026 7,38E-05 3,078 0,001 2,835 0,003 0,302
1 Day After Report 0,030 8,11E-05 3,304 0,000 3,665 0,000 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,028 8,85E-05 2,963 0,002 3,313 0,001 0,001
5 Days After Report 0,029 9,59E-05 2,992 0,001 3,430 0,001 0,000
10 Days After Report 0,027 1,14E-04 2,534 0,006 2,476 0,007 0,002
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon Shapiro-Wilk
 
 
Board Member 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,013 4,27E-05 1,965 0,025 2,257 0,012 0,000
1 Day After Report 0,011 4,70E-05 1,657 0,049 2,382 0,008 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,011 5,12E-05 1,556 0,060 1,927 0,027 0,000
5 Days After Report 0,013 5,55E-05 1,690 0,045 2,009 0,220 0,000
10 Days After Report 0,015 6,62E-05 1,813 0,035 1,734 0,041 0,000
Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
Large Shareholders 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,016 1,75E-04 1,198 0,115 1,235 0,119 0,394
1 Day After Report 0,012 1,93E-04 0,836 0,202 1,022 0,154 0,254
3 Days After Report 0,005 2,10E-04 0,354 0,362 0,624 0,267 0,084
5 Days After Report 0,011 2,28E-04 0,752 0,226 0,766 0,222 0,471
10 Days After Report 0,018 2,71E-04 1,065 0,143 0,801 0,212 0,157
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon Shapiro-Wilk
 
 
Others 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,017 5,11E-05 2,356 0,009 2,414 0,008 0,000
1 Day After Report 0,019 5,63E-05 2,565 0,005 3,603 0,000 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,023 6,14E-05 2,952 0,002 3,885 0,000 0,000
5 Days After Report 0,026 6,65E-05 3,189 0,001 4,128 0,000 0,000
10 Days After Report 0,028 7,93E-05 3,124 0,001 3,784 0,000 0,000
Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
8.7.2 Bid Price 
CEO / Vice President 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,019 7,22E-05 2,198 0,014 2,077 0,019 0,262
1 Day After Report 0,025 7,94E-05 2,755 0,003 2,984 0,001 0,001
3 Days After Report 0,022 8,67E-05 2,328 0,010 2,570 0,005 0,005
5 Days After Report 0,021 9,39E-05 2,216 0,013 2,651 0,004 0,000
10 Days After Report 0,020 1,12E-04 1,928 0,027 1,924 0,027 0,013
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon Shapiro-Wilk
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Board Member 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,007 4,40E-05 1,025 0,153 1,008 0,152 0,000
1 Day After Report 0,008 4,84E-05 1,154 0,124 1,783 0,037 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,008 5,28E-05 1,069 0,142 1,303 0,097 0,000
5 Days After Report 0,010 5,72E-05 1,291 0,098 1,593 0,056 0,000
10 Days After Report 0,008 6,82E-05 0,939 0,174 1,006 0,158 0,000
Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
Large Shareholders 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,013 5,23E-05 1,754 0,040 1,029 0,152 0,377
1 Day After Report 0,010 5,76E-05 1,300 0,097 1,066 0,244 0,019
3 Days After Report 0,005 6,28E-05 0,636 0,263 0,774 0,219 0,008
5 Days After Report 0,005 6,80E-05 0,604 0,273 0,637 0,212 0,021
10 Days After Report 0,017 8,11E-05 1,937 0,026 1,102 0,135 0,640
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon Shapiro-Wilk
 
 
Others 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,014 5,11E-05 2,016 0,022 1,742 0,041 0,000
1 Day After Report 0,019 5,62E-05 2,505 0,006 3,292 0,001 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,022 6,13E-05 2,748 0,003 3,286 0,001 0,000
5 Days After Report 0,025 6,64E-05 3,072 0,001 3,535 0,000 0,000
10 Days After Report 0,026 7,92E-05 2,967 0,002 3,127 0,001 0,000
Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
8.7.3 Ask Price 
CEO / Vice President 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,026 7,08E-05 3,048 0,001 2,916 0,002 0,707
1 Day After Report 0,029 7,79E-05 3,250 0,001 3,526 0,000 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,028 8,50E-05 3,009 0,001 3,369 0,001 0,000
5 Days After Report 0,028 9,21E-05 2,929 0,002 3,311 0,001 0,000
10 Days After Report 0,026 1,10E-04 2,488 0,006 2,505 0,006 0,004
CAAR Shapiro-WilkWilcoxon Student´s t-testvar(CAAR)CAAR
 
 
Board Member 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,013 9,13E-05 1,376 0,084 2,214 0,014 0,000
1 Day After Report 0,010 1,00E-04 0,993 0,160 2,342 0,009 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,012 1,10E-04 1,124 0,131 2,076 0,019 0,000
5 Days After Report 0,012 1,19E-04 1,072 0,142 1,977 0,024 0,000
10 Days After Report 0,014 1,41E-04 1,155 0,124 1,693 0,045 0,000
Wilcoxon Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test
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Large Shareholders 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,018 1,90E-04 1,303 0,096 1,456 0,073 0,475
1 Day After Report 0,013 2,09E-04 0,919 0,179 1,173 0,121 0,137
3 Days After Report 0,007 2,28E-04 0,477 0,317 0,861 0,189 0,022
5 Days After Report 0,010 2,47E-04 0,622 0,267 0,916 0,180 0,120
10 Days After Report 0,020 2,95E-04 1,139 0,127 1,076 0,141 0,337
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon Shapiro-Wilk
 
 
Others 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,019 5,10E-05 2,611 0,005 2,683 0,004 0,001
1 Day After Report 0,021 5,61E-05 2,812 0,002 3,746 0,000 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,023 6,12E-05 2,989 0,001 3,804 0,000 0,000
5 Days After Report 0,026 6,63E-05 3,148 0,001 3,805 0,000 0,000
10 Days After Report 0,028 7,90E-05 3,137 0,001 3,575 0,000 0,000
Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
8.8 Market-to-Book Values 
8.8.1 Close Price 
Quartile 1 
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Shapiro-Wilk
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,016 1,22E-04 1,480 0,069 1,733 0,042 0,034
1 Day After Report 0,003 1,34E-04 0,264 0,396 1,597 0,055 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,003 1,46E-04 0,214 0,415 1,516 0,065 0,000
5 Days After Report 0,003 1,58E-04 0,216 0,414 1,472 0,071 0,000
10 Days After Report 0,005 1,89E-04 0,362 0,359 1,231 0,109 0,000
Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
Quartile 2 
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Shapiro-Wilk
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,014 1,08E-04 1,379 0,084 1,317 0,094 0,266
1 Day After Report 0,019 1,18E-04 1,717 0,043 2,138 0,017 0,020
3 Days After Report 0,015 1,29E-04 1,343 0,090 1,798 0,036 0,021
5 Days After Report 0,012 1,40E-04 1,050 0,147 1,551 0,061 0,025
10 Days After Report 0,006 1,67E-04 0,446 0,328 1,016 0,155 0,003
Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
Quartile 3 
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Shapiro-Wilk
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,025 1,11E-04 2,394 0,008 2,712 0,004 0,000
1 Day After Report 0,033 1,22E-04 2,949 0,002 2,395 0,008 0,041
3 Days After Report 0,034 1,33E-04 2,970 0,001 2,295 0,011 0,014
5 Days After Report 0,037 1,44E-04 3,085 0,001 2,258 0,012 0,011
10 Days After Report 0,046 1,72E-04 3,526 0,000 2,659 0,004 0,001
Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
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Quartile 4 
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Shapiro-Wilk
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,005 1,20E-04 0,454 0,325 0,115 0,454 0,021
1 Day After Report 0,006 1,32E-04 0,534 0,297 0,379 0,352 0,895
3 Days After Report 0,010 1,44E-04 0,815 0,207 0,559 0,283 0,302
5 Days After Report 0,015 1,56E-04 1,215 0,112 1,157 0,123 0,069
10 Days After Report 0,024 1,87E-04 1,741 0,041 1,207 0,114 0,004
Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
8.8.2 Bid Price 
Quartile 1 
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Shapiro-Wilk
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,010 1,19E-04 0,875 0,191 0,826 0,204 0,001
1 Day After Report -0,001 1,31E-04 -0,048 0,519 1,223 0,110 0,000
3 Days After Report -0,006 1,43E-04 -0,486 0,687 0,733 0,232 0,000
5 Days After Report -0,003 1,55E-04 -0,275 0,608 0,850 0,198 0,000
10 Days After Report -0,006 1,85E-04 -0,476 0,683 0,756 0,225 0,000
Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
Quartile 2 
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Shapiro-Wilk
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,011 1,06E-04 1,060 0,144 1,163 0,123 0,675
1 Day After Report 0,021 1,17E-04 1,912 0,028 2,212 0,014 0,011
3 Days After Report 0,019 1,27E-04 1,679 0,047 2,065 0,019 0,021
5 Days After Report 0,015 1,38E-04 1,252 0,105 1,744 0,040 0,016
10 Days After Report 0,008 1,64E-04 0,587 0,279 0,980 0,163 0,065
Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
Quartile 3 
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Shapiro-Wilk
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,011 1,06E-04 1,060 0,144 1,163 0,123 0,675
1 Day After Report 0,021 1,17E-04 1,912 0,028 2,212 0,014 0,011
3 Days After Report 0,019 1,27E-04 1,679 0,047 2,065 0,019 0,021
5 Days After Report 0,015 1,38E-04 1,252 0,105 1,744 0,040 0,016
10 Days After Report 0,008 1,64E-04 0,587 0,279 0,980 0,163 0,065
Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
Quartile 4 
 
 
 
 
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Shapiro-Wilk
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report -0,006 1,27E-04 -0,500 0,691 0,887 0,188 0,085
1 Day After Report 0,001 1,40E-04 0,045 0,482 0,213 0,415 0,314
3 Days After Report 0,002 1,53E-04 0,145 0,443 0,192 0,424 0,119
5 Days After Report 0,009 1,65E-04 0,693 0,244 0,366 0,357 0,010
10 Days After Report 0,016 1,97E-04 1,135 0,128 0,420 0,337 0,001
Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
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8.8.3 Ask Price 
Quartile 1 
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Shapiro-Wilk
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,005 1,17E-04 0,433 0,333 1,093 0,138 0,010
1 Day After Report -0,006 1,29E-04 -0,491 0,688 0,391 0,350 0,000
3 Days After Report -0,005 1,41E-04 -0,437 0,669 0,317 0,376 0,004
5 Days After Report -0,011 1,53E-04 -9,18E-01 0,821 0,273 0,393 0,001
10 Days After Report -0,005 1,82E-04 -0,391 0,652 0,195 0,423 0,010
Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
Quartile 2 
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Shapiro-Wilk
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,032 1,24E-04 2,877 0,002 2,842 0,002 0,003
1 Day After Report 0,040 1,36E-04 3,391 0,000 3,353 0,000 0,455
3 Days After Report 0,036 1,49E-04 2,945 0,002 2,873 0,002 0,960
5 Days After Report 0,035 1,61E-04 2,732 0,003 2,886 0,002 0,971
10 Days After Report 0,035 1,92E-04 2,499 0,006 2,679 0,003 0,720
Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
Quartile 3 
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Shapiro-Wilk
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,020 1,18E-04 1,830 0,034 1,286 0,099 0,002
1 Day After Report 0,025 1,29E-04 2,205 0,014 2,136 0,017 0,202
3 Days After Report 0,028 1,41E-04 2,392 0,008 2,390 0,008 0,006
5 Days After Report 0,033 1,53E-04 2,639 0,004 2,529 0,006 0,136
10 Days After Report 0,046 1,82E-04 3,379 0,000 2,559 0,005 0,010
Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
Quartile 4 
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Shapiro-Wilk
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,010 1,11E-04 0,985 0,162 1,657 0,048 0,008
1 Day After Report 0,000 1,22E-04 0,021 0,492 1,000 0,158 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,002 1,33E-04 0,156 0,438 0,793 0,214 0,000
5 Days After Report 0,006 1,44E-04 0,464 0,321 1,117 0,132 0,000
10 Days After Report -0,002 1,72E-04 -0,153 0,561 0,746 0,228 0,000
Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
8.9 Financial Crisis / Non-Crisis 
8.9.1 Close Prices 
2010 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,011 1,23E-04 1,029 0,152 0,086 0,466 0,000
1 Day After Report 0,020 1,35E-04 1,693 0,045 1,213 0,113 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,019 1,47E-04 1,545 0,061 1,113 0,133 0,001
5 Days After Report 0,019 1,60E-04 1,469 0,071 1,175 0,120 0,002
10 Days After Report 0,021 1,90E-04 1,520 0,064 1,386 0,083 0,007
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon Shapiro-Wilk
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2009 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,008 1,91E-04 0,546 0,293 0,595 0,276 0,013
1 Day After Report -0,005 2,10E-04 -0,353 0,638 0,012 0,495 0,042
3 Days After Report -0,012 2,29E-04 -0,760 0,776 0,346 0,365 0,009
5 Days After Report -0,005 2,49E-04 -0,332 0,630 0,117 0,454 0,097
10 Days After Report -0,007 2,96E-04 -0,418 0,662 0,197 0,422 0,057
Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
2008 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,004 1,20E-04 0,385 0,350 0,745 0,228 0,180
1 Day After Report 0,004 1,32E-04 0,313 0,377 0,989 0,161 0,009
3 Days After Report 0,002 1,44E-04 0,198 0,421 0,639 0,261 0,214
5 Days After Report 0,000 1,56E-04 0,030 0,488 0,391 0,348 0,078
10 Days After Report 0,008 1,86E-04 0,610 0,271 0,646 0,259 0,007
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon Shapiro-Wilk
 
 
2007 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,031 5,90E-05 3,995 0,000 3,530 0,000 0,018
1 Day After Report 0,034 6,49E-05 4,275 0,000 3,806 0,000 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,039 7,08E-05 4,692 0,000 4,173 0,000 0,000
5 Days After Report 0,042 7,67E-05 4,811 0,000 4,247 0,000 0,000
10 Days After Report 0,043 9,15E-05 4,484 0,000 3,738 0,000 0,000
Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
8.9.2 Bid Prices 
2010 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,010 1,15E-04 0,974 0,165 0,064 0,475 0,000
1 Day After Report 0,020 1,27E-04 1,744 0,041 1,396 0,081 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,017 1,38E-04 1,433 0,076 1,062 0,144 0,000
5 Days After Report 0,016 1,50E-04 1,326 0,092 1,146 0,126 0,000
10 Days After Report 0,018 1,78E-04 1,358 0,087 1,391 0,082 0,000
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon Shapiro-Wilk
 
 
2009 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report -0,011 2,14E-04 -0,732 0,768 1,035 0,151 0,005
1 Day After Report -0,022 2,35E-04 -1,461 0,928 1,283 0,099 0,020
3 Days After Report -0,025 2,56E-04 -1,576 0,942 1,479 0,069 0,018
5 Days After Report -0,019 2,78E-04 -1,116 0,868 0,877 0,190 0,152
10 Days After Report -0,033 3,31E-04 -1,829 0,966 1,317 0,094 0,000
Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
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2008 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report -0,003 1,19E-04 -0,317 0,624 0,047 0,481 0,037
1 Day After Report -0,001 1,31E-04 -0,069 0,528 0,444 0,328 0,000
3 Days After Report -0,001 1,43E-04 -0,101 0,540 0,242 0,404 0,002
5 Days After Report -0,003 1,55E-04 -0,269 0,606 0,047 0,481 0,001
10 Days After Report 0,003 1,84E-04 0,223 0,412 0,070 0,472 0,001
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon Shapiro-Wilk
 
2007 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,032 5,79E-05 4,266 0,000 3,428 0,001 0,000
1 Day After Report 0,039 6,37E-05 4,896 0,000 4,225 0,000 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,042 6,95E-05 5,019 0,000 4,164 0,000 0,000
5 Days After Report 0,046 7,53E-05 5,274 0,000 4,544 0,000 0,000
10 Days After Report 0,048 8,97E-05 5,115 0,000 3,923 0,000 0,000
Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
8.9.3 Ask Prices 
2010 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,012 1,10E-04 1,151 0,125 0,369 0,357 0,000
1 Day After Report 0,019 1,21E-04 1,700 0,045 1,266 0,102 0,003
3 Days After Report 0,018 1,32E-04 1,568 0,058 1,089 0,138 0,007
5 Days After Report 0,016 1,43E-04 1,375 0,084 1,094 0,137 0,120
10 Days After Report 0,018 1,71E-04 1,381 0,084 1,228 0,110 0,142
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon Shapiro-Wilk
 
 
2009 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,015 2,07E-04 1,028 0,152 1,668 0,048 0,029
1 Day After Report -0,002 2,28E-04 -0,157 0,562 0,277 0,391 0,091
3 Days After Report -0,010 2,48E-04 -0,616 0,731 0,251 0,401 0,015
5 Days After Report -0,006 2,69E-04 -0,384 0,649 0,053 0,479 0,149
10 Days After Report -0,010 3,21E-04 -0,543 0,706 0,440 0,328 0,073
Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
2008 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,003 1,27E-04 0,237 0,406 0,606 0,272 0,092
1 Day After Report 0,000 1,40E-04 0,029 0,488 0,987 0,162 0,010
3 Days After Report 0,002 1,53E-04 0,158 0,437 0,681 0,248 0,081
5 Days After Report -0,001 1,66E-04 -0,055 0,522 0,363 0,358 0,034
10 Days After Report 0,006 1,98E-04 0,425 0,336 0,548 0,292 0,023
CAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon Shapiro-Wilk
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2007 
t p-value Z p-value
1 Day Before Report 0,031 5,69E-05 4,154 0,000 3,399 0,001 0,007
1 Day After Report 0,033 6,26E-05 4,223 0,000 3,552 0,000 0,000
3 Days After Report 0,039 6,83E-05 4,749 0,000 3,908 0,000 0,000
5 Days After Report 0,041 7,40E-05 4,766 0,000 3,999 0,000 0,000
10 Days After Report 0,044 8,83E-05 4,726 0,000 3,651 0,000 0,000
Shapiro-WilkCAAR CAAR var(CAAR) Student´s t-test Wilcoxon 
 
 
